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A core proposition in economics is that voluntary exchanges benefit both parties. We show that people 
often deny the mutually beneficial nature of exchange, instead espousing the belief that one or both 
parties fail to benefit from the exchange. Across 4 studies (and 8 further studies in the Supplementary 
Materials), participants read about simple exchanges of goods and services, judging whether each party 
to the transaction was better off or worse off afterwards. These studies revealed that win–win denial is 
pervasive, with buyers consistently seen as less likely to benefit from transactions than sellers. Several 
potential psychological mechanisms underlying win–win denial are considered, with the most 
important influences being mercantilist theories of value (confusing wealth for money) and theory of mind 
limits (failing to observe that people do not arbitrarily enter exchanges). We argue that these results 
have widespread implications for politics and society. 
 
Keywords: Folk economics, zero-sum thinking, intuitive theories, theory of mind, decision-making. 
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Introduction 
Economics is built on a seemingly commonsense insight: There are gains from trade—voluntary 
transactions benefit both parties. This has been recognized since at least the time of Adam Smith, who 
wrote in The Wealth of Nations (1999/1776): 
 
But man has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect 
it from their benevolence only. He will be far more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love in 
his favour, and show them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires of them. 
Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall have this 
which you want, is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one another 
the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of (p. 118–119; emphasis added). 
 
Buyers do not buy something they value less than its price, and sellers do not sell something they value 
more. Within this range between the buyer’s maximum and seller’s minimum price, both parties 
benefit from the transaction. Arguably, opportunities for mutual gain from specialization and trade 
are the main reason why humans can accomplish more in groups than individually; the extent of these 
opportunities explains why economic development has proceeded more rapidly in some times and 
places than in others (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Smith, 1999/1776). 
The principle that voluntary transactions are win–win is a cornerstone of neoclassical economics 
(Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 1995). But even behavioral economists—who have shown that 
people sometimes make suboptimal choices (Kahneman, 2002; Simon, 1955; Thaler, 1980 among 
many others)—agree that people make reasonable choices most of the time. For example, Thaler 
(1980) reassures us that “if a problem is sufficiently simple the normative [utility-maximization] theory 
will be acceptable” (pg. 39), citing demonstrations that key theorems of classical economics hold 
among irrational consumers (Becker, 1962) and even among rats (Kagel et al., 1975). Thaler concludes 
that heuristics lead to consumers to make “occasional” mistakes while they “are doing the best they 
can” (pg. 59). Indeed, a leading textbook in consumer behavior—hardly a field obsessed with praising 
human rationality—notes that “the idea that trade is always good is actually fairly obvious: if both 
parties were not better off, one or other would not be prepared to make the trade” (Blythe, 2013). 
Although people are not fully rational, they are not fools either: Absent coercion or deception, we 
rarely cede something we value highly for something we value less. 
This principle implies that international trade is positive-sum—a conclusion endorsed by 
economists across the political spectrum, from Paul Krugman (1996) to Milton Friedman (1962). For 
example, when a panel of  44 ideologically diverse economists were asked to rate their agreement with 
the statement, “Freer trade improves productive efficiency and offers consumers better choices, and 
in the long run these gains are much larger than any effects on employment” 95% agreed or strongly 
agreed, and none disagreed (IGM Forum, 2012). 
Yet many people seem to fallaciously deny the mutually beneficial nature of exchange (Caplan, 
2002), and these attitudes appear to permeate public policy. Politicians who promote populist, anti-
trade policies enjoyed enormous popularity on both left and right leading up to the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. In 2018, the United States initiated trade wars with its two largest trading 
partners—China and Canada—and although the negative results were obvious ex ante to most 
economists, they seemed to surprise many laypeople. The fallacy of win–win denial may be ubiquitous. 
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Consistent with the possibility that win–win transactions are unintuitive, these intellectual battles 
have been fought before. Adam Smith was writing primarily in opposition to the mercantilist 
economic philosophy of his contemporary England—a now-debunked theory that conceptualized 
wealth as the accumulation of gold, rather than goods and services, and therefore emphasized the 
importance of exports. (Sound familiar?) Even though economists have been long convinced by 
Smith’s arguments, battles against mercantilism and trade-protectionism must be fought anew each 
generation, as Ricardo (2004/1817), Bastiat (2007/1845), Marshall (1949/1879), Friedman (1962), and 
Krugman (1996) have done in turn. This need to re-learn basic economics anew each generation 
encourages the hypothesis that zero-sum thinking is psychologically natural—a hypothesis endorsed 
explicitly by economists including Bastiat (2007/1845) and Sowell (2008). 
The denial of transactions as win–win fits can explain zero-sum thinking—the belief that one 
party’s gain is another party’s loss. Zero-sum thinking is usually mistaken in economics precisely 
because individual trades do not make individual parties worse-off. Yet it appears to be endemic in 
people’s thinking about economic matters. Laypeople tend to believe that more profitable companies 
are less socially responsible (Bhattacharjee, Dana, & Baron, 2017), when the true correlation is just the 
opposite. Negotiators often perceive themselves as carving up a “fixed pie,” decreasing the chances 
of a successful outcome (Bazerman & Neale, 1983; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000). People believe 
that the government cannot benefit one group without harming another (Bazerman, Baron, & Shonk, 
2001) and are particularly inclined to think in zero-sum ways about international trade (Baron & Kemp, 
2004; Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2019) and immigration (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; 
Louis, Esses, & LaLonde, 2013). But zero-sum thinking also seems to be psychologically natural, 
occurring across many countries (Rózycka-Tran, Boski, & Wojciszke, 2015) and political orientations, 
though manifesting differently among liberals and conservatives (Davidai & Ongis, 2019). Zero-sum 
thinking has been noted in numerous settings (albeit not always fallaciously), including students’ 
thinking about grades (Meegan, 2010), reasoners thinking about evidence (Pilditch, Fenton, & 
Lagnado, 2018), consumers’ thinking about product features (Chernev, 2007; Newman, Gorlin, & 
Dhar, 2014), and even couples’ thinking about love (Burleigh, Rubel, & Meegan, 2017). 
Here, we examine how the denial of win–win transactions contributes to zero-sum thinking about 
simple transactions between individual buyers and sellers. We use this setting for three reasons. First, 
win–win denial is most clearly a normative error in simple economic transactions—like buying olive 
oil, hiring a hair stylist, or swapping kitchen supplies with a neighbor—compared to other, more 
complicated situations where there is more potential for behavioral biases to prevail or fraud to occur. 
(In the General Discussion, we consider whether, despite our best efforts, some of these transactions 
might be correctly perceived as zero-sum.) Second, these transactions are highly familiar: Given that 
consumers themselves have bountiful experience engaging in win–win trades, denial of mutual benefit 
here would be a particularly powerful demonstration of our hypotheses. Third, such simple 
transactions are nonetheless a microcosm of more complex transactions, such as international trade, 




Our studies test when, and to what extent, people believe that one or both parties did not benefit 
from an economic exchange. We considered four possible contributing mechanisms. 
 
Evolutionary Mismatch 
First, some have argued that humans are evolutionarily adapted for like-kind exchanges such as 
barter (Boyer & Petersen, 2018; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fiske, 1992; Pinker, 2003; see also Trivers, 
1971). For example, people can adeptly solve otherwise unintuitive abstract reasoning problems such 
as the Wason card task when they are framed in terms of social exchange (Cosmides, 1989). It makes 
evolutionary sense that we should have mental modules devoted to regulating social exchange, which 
must include some mechanism for valuing potential exchange opportunities and ensuring that one 
benefits from each exchange. For instance, in Fiske’s (1992) typology, Equality Matching relationships 
occur between trading partners when the exchange is “one-for-one” in the sense that similar items are 
reciprocally exchanged over time, as in gift exchange or carpooling. 
However, it is not clear that these adaptations would be well-suited to contemplating modern, 
currency-mediated exchanges. Whereas Fiske’s (1992) Equality Matching relationships appear to be 
near-universal across cultures, Market Pricing relationships—in which people trade disparate goods 
or services based on the principle of proportionality, typically mediated by money—seem to have 
become ubiquitous only after the Industrial Revolution (Polanyi, 1944). Money itself, of course, did 
not exist in our evolutionary ancestors’ environment, nor did the requisite mathematics for market 
pricing. At best, we would expect intuitions to be worse for thinking about monetary exchanges rather 
than like-kind barters, where we should be adept at recognizing win–win trades. Conceivably, people 
might even undervalue money since it lacks intrinsic value, believing that buyers are better-off after 




Second, the error could lie in how people conceptualize value. Economists since Smith 
(1999/1776) have labored, with limited success, against mercantilist theories of wealth and trade. Such 
theories equate wealth with money, neglecting the insight that money is valuable only because it can 
be used to purchase valuable things. For instance, the United States is not made “poorer” by 
purchasing goods from China, as though imports are wealth-decreasing and exports are wealth-
increasing. If China accepted dollars in exchange for products, and imported nothing in return—for 
example, because they burned the dollars—then Americans would be wealthier, not poorer, because 
they would have received something but would not have given up anything. Dollars are pieces of 
paper (or bits of information) with no intrinsic value in themselves. We are better off to the extent we 
can command resources, which may or may not be better facilitated by possessing currency or by 
exchanging it for useful commodities (e.g., see Hume, 1985/1752 on the balance of trade). 
But there is reason to think that mercantilist thinking is widespread. Analogously, the medieval 
theory of motion (which posits curvilinear momentum for objects) was discredited by Newton and is 
now universally disclaimed among physicists. Yet this idea remains intuitive to laypeople and may even 
be built into our perceptual systems (Hubbard, 1996). Similarly, despite Smith’s debunking of 
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mercantilism in the 18th century, it maintains an intuitive psychological appeal. In the General 
Discussion we speculate about reasons why mercantilism might be intuitive, but for now simply note 
that surveyed attitudes toward economic policies (Caplan, 2002) seem consistent with the hypothesis 
that laypeople, but not economists, rely on a mercantilist theory of value in their policy preferences. 
In the context of our studies, mercantilism is equivalent to over-valuing money. If most people 
are intuitive mercantilists, then they would perceive sellers as better off than buyers, because the seller 
is always the party who gains currency, even if they had to give up something valuable in order to gain 
the currency. They would also tend to think that neither party benefitted from a barter, since neither 
party gained currency. 
These predictions diverge strikingly from those made by neoclassical economic theory, particularly 
the prediction that sellers will be seen as winning from transactions whereas buyers will often be seen 
as losing. According to standard economic theory, welfare losses from voluntary transactions are not 
possible (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). And although models typically assume that it is theoretically possible 
for transactions not to benefit one or both parties, the party more typically getting the short end of 
these transactions is actually the seller in the conventional theory. Why? Because under perfect 
competition, sellers must price at marginal cost, experiencing zero economic profits (i.e., zero profits 
above taxes and the cost of capital; note that this does allow “accounting profits” that account for the 
alternative uses of the business’s capital). Under these circumstances it is plausible to claim that the 
seller did not experience a welfare gain from a trade—although of course absolutely perfect 
competition is rare in the real world. The point is simply that buyers’ losses from voluntary transactions 
are an emphatic departure from economic theory in the absence of force or fraud (an issue we consider 
in the General Discussion). 
 
Theory of Mind 
Third, the error could lie in cognitive processing—specifically, the failure to consider the mental 
states of the transaction parties. People often act as though their own subjective experiences reflect a 
reality that is equally accessible to others—a form of perspective-taking error known as naïve realism 
(Ross & Ward, 1997; see also Ross, Greene, & House, 1977 on the false consensus effect). Yet, one 
way to see that voluntary transactions are win–win is precisely to consider the preferences of the buyer 
and seller, rather than one’s self. You may not think that a ticket to the Broadway musical Hamilton 
would benefit you at its $375 price tag, but when Russ buys a ticket at this price, he clearly values the 
ticket more than $375. Thinking about this from Russ’s perspective makes this obvious, but naïvely 
believing the ticket has an intrinsic value less than $375 clouds the issue. 
Thus, if theory of mind limits are implicated in win–win denial, experimental manipulations that 
encourage people to think about the transactors’ mental states should make people more likely to view 
exchanges as mutually beneficial. People should be more prone to view transactions as win–win when 
the parties’ reasons or preferences are made more explicit or when they are encouraged to take the 




Fourth, the error could lie in how people approach the question. Even though economic theory 
and commonsense arguments do tell us the direction of welfare gains from trade, estimating the 
magnitude of these gains is very challenging. People might thus substitute this difficult question (“Is 
John better off after the exchange compared to before?”) for a simpler question that we often consider 
as consumers (“Did John get a good deal, compared to other deals I know about?”)—what we term 
the bargain heuristic. This attribute substitution process is thought to be fundamental to much heuristic 
judgment and decision-making (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) by reducing the effort required to make 
any particular judgment even as errors can be introduced (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2008). 
The reason that the bargain heuristic can lead to errors is that a purchase may very well be welfare-
improving, even though welfare is not improved as much as it would be if the buyer got a better bargain. 
To tweak the famous example (Thaler, 1985), if you are staying at a remote resort hotel, the resort 
may well be able to use its local market power to charge you the exorbitant price of $10 for a beer. 
Yet if you consummate this exchange, it is precisely because you still value the beer more than $10 
despite the fact that this is a poor bargain. The bargain heuristic will instead deliver the incorrect 
verdict that you were made worse-off by this trade. You are worse-off only compared to a 
counterfactual world in which the market is more competitive. You are not worse-off after the 
transaction than you were before. 
Hence, if the bargain heuristic underlies win–win denial, then sellers should be seen as better-off 
and buyers often as worse-off when the price is high (a bad bargain). In contrast, when the price is 
low (a good bargain), buyers should be seen as better-off and, perhaps, sellers as worse-off, since in 
such cases the seller is getting the raw end of the bargain. This prediction differs from mercantilism, in 
that it does not place any special emphasis on money relative to real goods and services and outlines 
a case where sellers might be seen as worse-off (which should rarely occur on a mercantilist account, 
since sellers are gaining currency). The bargain heuristic account is related to the theory of mind 
account, since a perspective-taking error is a prerequisite to using the bargain heuristic. Thinking about 
the transaction from the transactors’ perspectives makes it clear why the quality of the bargain is 
irrelevant to at least the direction of the welfare change—even if the buyer got a “bad” deal, it must not 
be so bad that she did not feel that she benefitted on balance. 
 
Overview of Experiments 
Four studies tested win–win denial and its moderators. The general method of these experiments 
was to ask participants about ordinary exchanges of goods or services—for example, Sally purchasing 
a shirt from Tony’s store, Eric purchasing a haircut from Paul’s barber shop, or Mark trading his soy 
sauce for Fred’s vinegar. For each transaction, participants were asked whether or not each party was 
better off after the transaction. From the standpoint of neoclassical economics, all parties were better 
off after all exchanges, since people do not voluntarily enter into transactions at a loss, and we sought 
to avoid conditions under which behavioral amendments to economics would be likely to produce 
major exceptions. Nonetheless, if people engage in win–win denial, we would expect to see a 
widespread belief that some parties to these exchanges do not benefit. 
The particular pattern of non-benefit can help to test the potential mechanisms for win–win denial. 
If mercantilism is the culprit, we would expect to see buyers (but not sellers) perceived as worse-off 
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and barters as pointlessly failing to benefit either party. On the other hand, the evolutionary mismatch 
account suggests that people may be better at recognizing positive-sum transactions among like-kind 
barters rather than monetary transactions, where people might even believe that sellers are made 
worse-off since they give up valuable goods in exchange for intrinsically valueless currency. These 
hypotheses were tested in Study 1.  
Study 2 tested a further implication of mercantilism—that exchanges described in terms of time 
(labor) rather than money would be seen as more beneficial. Study 3 tested the theory of mind account 
by attempting to induce participants to take the perspective of the buyer by giving reasons for the 
buyer’s purchase. Finally, Study 4 varied the prices of monetary exchanges to test heuristic substitution 
account, since very inexpensive products should then be seen as benefitting the consumers at the 
expense of the seller. 
In the Supplementary Materials, we report several additional replication studies (Part B), including 
studies that varied the framing of the transactions or wording of the dependent variable (Studies S1, 
S4, and S5) and between-subjects replications of key results (Studies S2 and S3). We also pool data 




Our first study tested win–win denial for various goods and services. We asked participants to 
read about simple, everyday transactions, including monetary purchases of goods (e.g., olive oil, a car), 
monetary purchases of services (e.g., a haircut, a plumber), and barters of goods (e.g., a McDonald’s 
sandwich for a Burger King sandwich, or soy sauce for vinegar). Participants then rated the welfare of 
the buyer and seller (or traders, in the case of barter), relative to before the transaction. 
This experiment probes two sets of questions. First, how often do people deny that transactions 
are win–win? If people understand the underlying principles of economics, they should indicate that 
both buyer and seller are better off after most or all transactions, because the transactions are 
voluntary. On the other hand, if people deny the win–win nature of trade, then they may often believe 
that either the buyer or seller failed to be bettered by the transaction, or even was worse off after the 
transaction.  
Second, what pattern of perceived gains and losses do people perceive? The mercantilist theory of 
value—on which money has value over-and-above the goods and services it can purchase—suggests 
that benefits should “follow the money.” That is, sellers should be seen as gaining more often than 
buyers (since sellers are gaining money and giving up a good or service, whereas the converse is true 
for buyers). Further, for barters, the traders would be likely seen as neither better nor worse off than 
before, because no money changes hands. 
 
Methods 
Across all studies reported in this article, we recruited U.S. participants from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk because they tend to be more diverse in age and education level compared to traditional 
undergraduate samples (albeit more politically liberal than the general U.S. public). Sample sizes were 
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set a priori and ranged from 100 participants (achieving 90% power for within-subjects effect sizes d 
> 0.33, using G*Power; Faul et al. 2007) to 200 participants (90% power for d > 0.23). 
For Study 1, we recruited 100 participants (Mage = 36.2; 62% female, 43% college educated [i.e., 
having at least a 4-year college degree]) from Mechanical Turk; 14 were excluded from analysis because 
they incorrectly answered more than 33% of a set of comprehension questions (see below).  
Participants read about a series of 12 transactions, and were instructed that “for each transaction, 
you will be asked whether each participant is better off, worse off, or the same, relative to how they 
were before the transaction.” The transactions were divided into three types—monetary purchases of 
goods, monetary purchases of services, and barters of goods. Four items of each type were used, and 
the 12 items were presented in a random order. 
For the monetary purchases of goods, participants read about transactions, such as “Sally goes to 
Tony’s clothing store. She pays Tony $30 for a shirt.” Other items included purchases of olive oil, a 
car, and a chocolate bar. Participants were then asked to rate the welfare-change of the buyer and 
seller—that is, how each party’s welfare compares after versus before the transaction (e.g., “How well 
off do you think Sally now is?” and “How well off do you think Tony now is?”) on a scale anchored 
at –5 (“Worse than before”), 0 (“Same as before”), and 5 (“Better than before”). Buyer and seller 
welfare-change were rated in a random order for each item. Monetary purchases of services were 
similar, except the transactions involved services rather than goods (e.g., “Eric goes to Paul’s barber 
shop. Eric pays Paul $15 for a haircut.”). Other items included purchases of massage, dog grooming, 
and plumbing services. For the barters of goods, participants read about two individuals exchanging 
goods, such as “Vivian goes to her colleague Tommy’s office. She trades her Burger King hamburger 
for Tommy’s McDonald’s hamburger” or “Mark goes to his neighbor Fred. Mark trades his bottle of 
soy sauce for Fred’s bottle of vinegar.” Other items included trading a pencil for an eraser and 
swapping two designer bags. The welfare-change of each party was rated on the same scale as for the 
monetary transactions. The full text of all items is given in Part A of the Supplementary Materials. 
After the main task, participants were asked a series of 12 check questions to monitor attention, 
each asking whether a particular item (e.g., “haircut” or “shirt”) was mentioned on the previous pages. 
Participants incorrectly answering more than 33% of these questions were excluded from analysis. 
At the end of the study, participants were asked to report demographic information. This included 
educational information, including education level, college major (if applicable), economics knowledge 
(“Please rate your knowledge of economics” on a scale from 0 [“Not knowledgeable”] to 10 [“Very 
knowledgeable”]), and number of economics courses. Participants were also asked about their political 
beliefs, including party affiliation, values on social issues, and values on economic issues, each on 
continuous 0 (Democrat/liberal) to 10 (Republican/conservative) scales. Finally, participants reported 
standard demographic information such as gender, age, and income. Part C of the Supplementary 
Materials reports descriptive statistics on these measures and their relationship with win–win denial. 
 
Results 
Win–win denial was endemic among our sample. Nearly all participants (94.2%) indicated that at 
least one party was made worse-off in at least one of the transactions. Since win–win denial is a logical 
prerequisite of zero-sum thinking—the belief that any gains from one party are compensated by losses 
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by the other party—it is not surprising that the vast majority of participants (88.4%) also believed that 
at least one of the transactions was zero- or negative-sum. 
Figure 1 plots the proportion of times that buyers, sellers, and traders were deemed to have gained 
(the white area), lost (the black area), or experienced neither gain nor loss (the grey area) from each 
type of transaction. Clearly, people are not neoclassical economists who would color this whole chart 
white. But nor are they responding at chance. The patterns of win, loss, and no-benefit across groups 
are instructive for teasing apart the different theoretical explanations we proposed for win–win denial. 
First, consider buyers versus sellers. Whereas basic economics says that both buyers and sellers 
benefit from transactions, people thought that buyers were much more likely to be made worse-off 
by their transactions than were sellers. Whereas very few sellers [M = 0.49, SD = 0.86 out of 8] were 
thought to be made worse-off by the trade, five times that many buyers were [M = 2.53, SD = 2.47 
out of 8; t(85) = 7.55, p < .001, d = 1.11]. The same pattern was evident when looking at the mean 
welfare-change score rather than the trichotomized proportions [M = 2.08, SD = 1.44 vs. M = 0.69, 
SD = 1.48 out of 8; t(85) = 8.75, p < .001, d = 0.95]. This result is consistent with mercantilism, which 
predicts that value should be seen to flow with (over-valued) money. 
Figure 1. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders in Study 1. 
 
Second, consider monetary transactions versus barters. Economics says that both traders in a 
barter benefit, since they otherwise would not have decided to make the trade. In contrast, participants 
were even more likely to perceive traders as failing to benefit compared to buyers. This occurred 
because the proportion of no-benefit transactions for traders [M = 3.29, SD = 2.98 out of 8] was 











d = 1.17] or sellers [M = 0.44, SD = 1.14 out of 8; t(85) = 8.76, p < .001, d = 1.26]. This led to a less 
positive welfare-change score for traders than for monetary transactions (averaging across buyers and 
sellers) [M = 0.51, SD = 0.93 vs. M = 1.38, SD = 1.26; t(85) = 7.15, p < .001, d = 0.79]. Once again, 
this is consistent with mercantilism, which predicts that transaction parties should be seen as gaining 
more when they are gaining currency rather than goods: On this mechanism, barters should often be 
seen as involving no-change in welfare to either party. This contrasts with the predictions of the 
evolutionary mismatch mechanism, which posits that we are adapted to reason about barters. If 
anything, people should thus be more prone see barters as win–win, since this view maintains that we 
are adapted for like-kind exchange. 
The more pronounced win–win denial for barters translated directly into zero-sum thinking. For 
the monetary transactions, participants thought on average that 0.90 (SD = 1.11) out of the 4 
purchases of goods and 0.62 (SD = 1.04) out of the 4 purchases of services to be zero- or negative-
sum, in the sense that the sum of both parties’ welfare-change scores was either zero or negative. 
These beliefs, while not overwhelming in magnitude, were widespread among participants: Most 
participants (60.5%) claimed that at least one of the monetary transactions was zero- or negative-sum. 
But zero-sum thinking for barters was much more common: More than half of the barters [M = 2.13, 
SD = 1.50 out of 4] were deemed zero- or negative-sum, far more than for either monetary purchases 
of goods [t(85) = 7.46, p < .001, d = 0.93] or services [t(85) = 9.20, p < .001, d = 1.17]. The great 
majority of participants (79.1%) believed that at least one of the barters was zero- or negative-sum. 
An alternative way to look at zero-sum thinking considers that a ‘+3’ from one party and ‘–2’ for 
the other does not necessarily reflect positive-sum thinking, as the preceding analysis assumes, as these 
welfare change scores are not necessarily commensurable. Thus, despite the considerable magnitude 
of zero-sum thinking revealed there, this may actually understate its prevalence. Table 1 reports the 
proportion of the 8 monetary transactions and 4 barters in which each party was seen as gaining, 
losing, or experiencing no change in welfare. Part A in the Supplementary Materials reports these 
results broken down by item, revealing that the pattern generalizes across items. 
 
  Sellers 
  Negative Zero Positive 
Buyers 
Negative 1.45% 0.44% 29.80% 
Zero 1.02% 3.05% 3.20% 
Positive 3.63% 2.03% 55.38% 
  Traders 
  Negative Zero Positive 
 Negative 2.33% 2.03% 22.10% 
Traders Zero  36.92% 6.40% 
 Positive   30.23% 
 
Table 1. Transaction types in Study 1. 
Note. Entries are the proportion of transactions, analyzed pairwise, in which each 
party was seen as benefitting (“positive”), losing (“negative”), or experiencing no 
change in welfare (“zero”). 
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For monetary transactions, participants agreed that about half of the transactions (55.4%) were 
win–win. Of the transactions denied to be win–win, a large majority were seen as win–lose (29.8% of 
the total) with sellers benefitting at the expense of buyers, whereas the converse (lose–win, with sellers 
losing but buyers benefitting) were rare (3.6%). This is consistent with the notion that mercantilism 
translates into rampant zero-sum thinking, but at odds with mainstream economic theory, according 
to which buyers are, if anything, more likely to gain from trade than sellers from voluntary transactions 
in competitive markets. Other combinations—such as negative-sum thinking with both parties losing 
or thinking that either the buyer or seller experienced no change in welfare—were rare, together 
accounting for about 10% of the transactions. 
For barters, participants denied that most of the transactions were win–win, with only 30.2% seen 
as win–win. Of the transactions not seen as win–win, about half were seen as benefitting neither party 
(36.9% of the total), and a substantial minority were seen as benefitting one trader but not the other 
(22.1%). Other combinations were again rare, together accounting for about 10% of the transactions. 
This again accords with the prediction of mercantilism that people should often deny any change in 
welfare when money does not change hands. 
 
Discussion 
Study 1 revealed three key results. First, a large majority of participants espoused win–win denial 
and a zero-sum mentality at least some of the time. This is consistent with our suggestion that these 
are natural psychological tendencies, supporting claims (e.g., Caplan, 2007; Rubin, 2003) that zero-
sum thinking accounts for at least a part of the difference between economists’ and laypeople’s 
reasoning about markets. 
Second, within monetary transactions, sellers were almost always seen as net beneficiaries, whereas 
buyers were often seen as net losers. This way of thinking seems bizarre, because it seems to imply 
that consumers believe themselves to be acting irrationally when making purchases—if purchases are 
often net losses, why do consumers make them? Yet, this pattern is consistent with mercantilist 
theories that equate money and wealth: Apparently Adam Smith (1999/1776) did not slay this demon. 
Third, win–win denial was even more prominent for barters than for monetary transactions: 
Traders were very often seen as neither gaining nor losing from their barters. This result further 
undercuts the idea that win–win denial is due to evolved instincts about exchange: To the extent that 
our evolutionary ancestors engaged in explicit trade of goods (e.g., in reciprocal altruism; Trivers, 
1971), these would have taken the forms of barters rather than monetary transactions. On this 
hypothesis, people should, if anything, be more prone to deny that monetary transcations are win–
win—the opposite of our finding. Of course, this evidence does not undermine the broader claim that 
humans are adapted for barter exchanges but not for money (e.g., Pinker, 2003)—only the idea that 
this adaptive mismatch is a major driver of win–win denial. 
One possible concern is that participants interpreted the phrases “better off” and “worse off” as 
referring specifically to financial well-being. We address this concern in three ways. First, in Study S1 
in the Supplementary Materials, we repeated Study 1 but phrasing the dependent variable in terms of 
whether or not parties “benefited” from the transaction. This study revealed a smaller degree of zero-
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sum thinking overall, but comparable asymmetries between buyers versus sellers and between 
monetary transactions versus barters. Second, in Study S4 in the Supplementary Materials, we add 
detailed instructions that emphasize that “better off” and “worse off” are not defined solely in terms 
of money but in terms of broader utility, as well as a series of check questions to ensure that 
participants understand this definition. The results of that study are very similar to Study 1. Finally, 
we will see that this interpretation of the wording would not lead to the differences we observe across 
subsequent experiments, since this phrasing was kept constant across the remaining experiments. 
Could one argue that these results actually contradict the notion of win–win denial, since a great 
majority of sellers, modest majority of buyers, and nearly half of traders were seen as benefitting from 
the transaction? We think this is a tough case to make, because chance responding is not a relevant 
comparison: The normative theory says that all (or nearly all) of the transactions should be seen as 
mutually beneficial, thus that is the most appropriate comparison. Empirically, we observe that nowhere 
near all of the transactions were seen as win–win. Consider base rate neglect—people’s inattention to 
prior probabilities—as a comparison. Whereas early studies seemingly found that people do not use 
base rates at all, more careful work later on revealed that people often do rely on them to some degree 
(see Koehler, 1996). Yet, it is still a mistake when people underweight base rates, even if they do not 
fail to consider them entirely. Similarly, it is a fallacy when people deny the mutually beneficial nature 
of trade even as they do not fail to recognize this entirely. These glasses can be plausibly be viewed as 
half-full (since people often use base rates to some degree and often acknowledge that trades are 
mutually beneficial) or half-empty (since people systematically underweight base rate information and 
systematically underappreciate the gains from trade). But these glasses are definitely not full. 
Ultimately one’s conclusion about our participants’ reasonableness will depend on one’s 
acceptance that the transactions in our studies should be properly viewed as win–win—that 
neoclassical economics is the appropriate normative standard for these cases. We think it is: 
Notwithstanding the existence of irrationality, most of our transactions were as routine and 
transparent as typical market transactions, and few would argue that behavioral bias afflicts all market 
activity (see Thaler, 1980). We flesh out this argument more fully in the General Discussion. 
Nonetheless, even if one believed that our participants’ level of win–win denial was reasonable, one 
would still need to explain its underlying mechanism. The current results support mercantilism in that 
benefit was widely seen as flowing with currency. 
Given the fairly high levels of win–win denial we see in the current studies, it is natural to ask 
whether this habit of thought is equally widespread among all participants, or if educational, 
ideological, or demographic differences moderate its magnitude. In Part B of the Supplementary 
Materials, we pool data from all studies (over 1000 participants) to test for individual differences with 
a great degree of statistical power. There were modest effects of economics knowledge, with more 
knowledgeable participants somewhat less prone toward win–win denial, but perhaps surprisingly, 
political ideology had little effect, nor did any demographic factor we tested. Thus, win–win denial 
does not seem to be tied to any particular political ideology and its levels are high even among those 




Study 1 provided several key pieces of evidence for mercantilist thinking as a mechanism for zero-
sum thinking: Individuals were almost always considered better off if they gained currency in a 
transaction (sellers), often considered worse off if they gave up currency (buyers), and usually 
considered no better off when no currency changed hands (traders). A further prediction of 
mercantilism is that taking the focus off of currency should reduce the asymmetry between buyers and 
sellers. That is, even though money usually changes hands in transactions, money is merely an 
intermediary that allows us to trade multilaterally—receiving money (usually in exchange for labor to 
our employer) and paying money (in exchange for goods and services from merchants) with different 
counterparties. Otherwise, surgeons wishing to get a haircut would need to search for a barber in need 
of a bypass operation, and professors wishing to purchase groceries would need to search for grocers 
in need of social psychology lessons. Money is a “veil” that facilitates barters of goods and services 
across individuals and over time. 
Though explainable intuitively, this idea may not occur spontaneously to people, which may in 
part explain the appeal of mercantilist thinking and zero-sum beliefs. It may nonetheless be possible 
to encourage this way of thinking by highlighting costs in terms of the labor required to make 
purchases, rather than in explicit monetary terms. We tested this prediction in Study 2 by describing 
transactions in terms of time (i.e., the number of hours worked to earn sufficient money to make a 
purchase or to earn the good being bartered) rather than the money or good itself. De-emphasizing 
that transactions are mediated by money should reduce the perception that buyers are made worse-
off (since their money-loss is less salient) but also the perception that sellers are made better-off (since 
their money-gain is less salient). 
 
Methods 
We recruited 200 participants (Mage = 36.4, 47% female, 54% college educated) from Mechanical 
Turk; 33 were excluded from analysis based on the criteria used in Study 1. 
The procedure was similar to Study 1, except each item appeared in either the money-frame or the 
time-frame. The money-frame version of each item was the same wording used in Study 1, whereas the 
time-frame version described the buyer’s (or one trader’s) side of each transaction in terms of labor 
rather than money. For example, the money-frame version of one item read “Sally goes to Tony’s 
clothing store. She pays Tony $30 for a shirt,” whereas the time-frame version read “Sally goes to 
Tony’s clothing store. Sally worked for 1.5 hours to pay Tony for a shirt,” and in a separate paragraph 
noted that, “Sally gets paid $20 per hour (after taxes) at her job.” This is mathematically equivalent to 
the Study 1 version, since 1.5 hours of work at $20 per hour equals $30. This equivalency was 
maintained across all items. 
A parallel modification was made for the barter items. For example, one Money-frame item read 
“Vivian goes to her colleague Tommy’s office. She trades her Burger King hamburger for Tommy’s 
McDonald’s hamburger,” whereas the time-frame version read “Vivian goes to her colleague Tommy’s 
office. Vivian worked for 20 minutes to pay for a Burger King hamburger, which she trades to Tommy 
in exchange for Tommy’s McDonald’s hamburger.” Vivian’s hourly wage was not included, since the 
explicit monetary cost was not included in Study 1. 
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Two items from each category (monetary purchases of goods, monetary purchases of services, 
and barters) appeared in each of the two conditions (counterbalanced). The money- and time-frame 
items were blocked, appearing in separate halves of the experiment, in a counterbalanced order. Within 
each block, items were presented in a random order.  
 
Results 
Overall, framing the transactions in terms of money versus time led to shifts in the perception of 
who gained versus lost from the transactions. While zero-sum thinking remained endemic and buyers 
were still more often seen as worse-off compared to sellers, these tendencies were muted. 
We look first at the money-frame, which replicated the basic results of Study 1. As shown in Figure 
2, participants were much likelier to think that buyers compared to sellers had negative outcomes from 
their transactions [M = 1.33, SD = 1.38 vs. M = 0.21, SD = 0.51 out of 4; t(166) = 9.65, p < .001, d = 
1.07]. Consequently, the average welfare score was much lower for buyers than for sellers [M = 0.67, 
SD = 1.53 vs. M = 1.92, SD = 1.31; t(166) = 10.21, p < .001, d = 0.88]. 
Figure 2. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders across the money-frame and time-frame conditions of Study 2. 
 
Comparing trades versus monetary transactions, participants considered traders as much likelier 
to experience zero change in welfare [M = 1.73, SD = 1.66 out of 4] compared to buyers [M = 0.36, 
SD = 0.81 out of 4; t(166) = 10.87, p < .001, d = 1.05] or sellers [M = 0.23, SD = 0.70 out of 4; t(166) 
= 11.17, p < .001, d = 1.18]. This led to less positive perceived welfare-change for barters than for 











1.18; t(166) = 6.87, p < .001, d = 0.55]. Overall, the results for buyers, sellers, and traders in the money-
frame replicate Study 1 not only qualitatively, but also reveal very similar means and effect sizes. 
If mercantilism indeed explains the asymmetries between buyers and sellers, we would expect 
time-framing to attenuate the perceived advantages to sellers, since time-framed transactions do not 
emphasize the transfer of (over-valued) money. Indeed, the trends observed for the money-frame 
were less pronounced in the time-frame, as shown in Figure 2. Compared to the money-frame, buyers 
in the time-frame were seen less often as losing [M = 1.33, SD = 1.38 vs. M = 1.09, SD = 1.31 out of 
4; t(166) = 2.42, p = .017, d = 0.18], and sellers less often as gaining [M = 3.56, SD = 3.19 vs. M = 
3.19, SD = 1.20 out of 4; t(166) = 4.26, p < .001, d = 0.36]. Relative to the money-frame, the time-
frame thus led to (marginally) higher average welfare scores for buyers [M = 0.67, SD = 1.53 vs. M = 
0.89, SD = 1.52; t(166) = 1.96, p = .052, d = 0.14] and lower scores for sellers [M = 1.92, SD = 1.31 
vs. M = 1.40, SD = 1.29; t(166) = 5.12, p < .001, d = 0.40]. Since money did not change hands, framing 
barters in terms of time-equivalent units should not influence judgments of welfare, and indeed this 
manipulation had little effect on perceptions of traders’ welfare: Relative to the money-frame, trades 
were only marginally less likely to be seen as zero-gain [M = 1.73, SD = 1.66 vs. M = 1.53, SD = 1.62 
out of 4; t(166) = 1.66, p = .099, d = 0.12] and the overall welfare-change score did not differ [M = 
0.65, SD = 1.17 vs. M = 0.66, SD = 1.14; t(166) = 0.18, p = .86, d = 0.01]. 
 
Discussion 
Overall, these results further buttress the mercantilism account. In addition to replicating the 
results of Study 1, Study 2 revealed that encouraging participants to think in terms of the time-cost 
rather than money-cost of transactions decreased win–win denial, with buyers about 18% less likely 
to be seen as losing. This is consistent with mercantilism, which predicts that any framing that de-
emphasizes money would decrease the asymmetry between buyers’ and sellers’ perceived welfare. 
A possible objection to these findings is that money in fact played no smaller role in these 
exchanges, but instead the transactions were merely framed in an unusual way. However, we would 
argue that this is precisely the point of this manipulation—to establish that drawing attention away 
from money and toward the more fundamental resource being exchanged (time) reduces the tendency 
toward win–win denial. A counterpoint may be that the framing manipulation is confounded in some 
way, and not only shifts attention but also introduces demand characteristics, changes inference 
patterns, or adds noise. For example, a reminder that one was willing to work in exchange for a good 
might increase the perceived strength of preferences for that good, or the unusual framing may have 
disrupted typical intuitions and added noise that makes the pattern less extreme. 
Studies we report in the Supplementary Materials speak against these possibilities. Study S2A 
replicates the moderating effect of time-framing in a between-subjects setting, speaking against 
potential demand characteristics. Study S2B frames the transactions in terms of both time and money; 
this should equally remind participants that the person had to work in exchange for the good and is 
similarly an unusual framing. Nonetheless, these results look very similar to the money-frame. This 
suggests that the time-frame reduces win–win denial not because it emphasizes time, but because it 
de-emphasizes money, supporting the argument for mercantilism.  
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Nonetheless, mercantilism alone does not appear to fully explain zero-sum thinking. Even with an 
emphasis on time rather than money, win–win denial was rampant in the time-frame condition, with 
more than 25% of the buyers still thought to be worse-off after their transactions. Thus, Studies 3 and 
4 examine other potential mechanisms. 
 
Study 3 
The key for why most transactions are win–win is that these transactions are voluntary, and people 
do not generally make purchases without believing it to benefit them. Economists do not need to be 
reminded of this, but laypeople might: Perspective-taking is effortful (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 
1996; Epley, Keysar, & Van Boven, 2004) and we erroneously impute our own beliefs and preferences 
to others (Ross & Ward, 1997; Ross et al., 1977). That is, absent a nudge to consider the buyers’ and 
sellers’ mental states, people may simply substitute their own preferences, which are likelier to be less 
favorable toward a purchase than the preferences of a person who is known to have made that 
purchase. Thus failure of perspective-taking could lead people to fail to realize that a transaction is 
unlikely to be conducted at a loss to either party. 
Study 3 tested whether giving reasons for the buyers’ decisions would attenuate win–win denial by 
making the voluntary nature of the transactions salient. Although we test other reasons in the 
Supplementary Materials (Study S3), Study 3 focuses on “empty reasons”—merely indicating that the 
buyer “wanted” the good or service being purchased (cf. Langer, Blank, & Chanowitz, 1978). These 
reasons are empty, from an economic perspective, because it is true of every voluntary purchase that 
the consumer wanted to purchase the product. Yet these reasons may not be psychologically empty, 
if they induce the participant to take the perspective of the buyer as a voluntary agent who would not 
choose to make a purchase at a loss. 
 
Methods 
We recruited 198 participants (Mage = 38.8; 51% female; 55% college educated) from Mechanical 
Turk; 23 were excluded from analysis based on the criterion used in previous studies. 
The procedure was similar to Study 1, except each item appeared in either the no-reason or empty-
reason condition. The no-reason version of each item used the same wording as Study 1, whereas the 
empty-reason version included a statement that the buyer or traders “wanted” to carry out the 
transaction. For example, Sally’s and Eric’s monetary transactions were explained as, “Sally made the 
purchase because she wanted the shirt” and “Eric made the purchase because he wanted the haircut.” 
Mark’s and Fred’s barter was explained as “Mark made the trade because he wanted vinegar and Fred 
made the trade because he wanted soy sauce.” 
Analogously to the design of Study 2, two items from each category appeared in each of the two 
conditions (counterbalanced). The conditions were blocked and appeared in a counterbalanced order, 




As shown in Figure 3, the same basic asymmetries between buyers, sellers, and traders were seen 
in Study 3. But these asymmetries were significantly smaller when a reason (albeit empty) was given 
for the buyer’s or traders’ choice. 
If theory of mind limits partly account for win–win denial, we would expect buyers to be seen as 
likelier to benefit when participants are encouraged to think about the buyers’ reasons. Indeed, buyers 
were seen as less likely to lose from transactions in the empty-reason than in the no-reason condition 
[M = 0.87, SD = 1.25 vs. M = 1.09, SD = 1.41 out of 4; t(174) = 2.43, p = .016, d = 0.16], manifesting 
in a comparable trend in the welfare-change scores [M = 1.32, SD = 1.57 vs. M = 0.86, SD = 1.64; 
t(174) = 4.64, p < .001, d = 0.29]. Thus, an intervention as simple as mentioning that the buyers 
“wanted” the products they were purchasing significantly attenuated win–win denial for buyers. 
Analogously, we would expect traders to be seen as likelier to benefit when their reasons are given. 
As shown in Figure 3, the proportion of “zero” responses was far smaller in the empty-reason than 
in the no-reason condition [M = 1.54, SD = 1.60 vs. M = 0.98, SD = 1.46 out of 4; t(174) = 4.53, p < 
.001, d = 0.37], resulting in much higher average welfare judgments for traders in the empty-reason 
than in the no-reason condition [M = 1.84, SD = 1.80 vs. M = 0.81, SD = 1.20; t(174) = 8.32, p < 
.001, d = 0.67]. This again supports theory of mind limits as a mechanism for win–win denial, with 
perspective-taking a partial remedy. 
Figure 3. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders across no-reason and empty-reason conditions of Study 3. 
 
We would not necessarily expect a comparable effect for sellers, for two reasons. First, the 
scenarios only mentioned the buyer’s reasons. Second, the seller’s reasons—profit-maximization—











nefarious motives among sellers, ascribing to them powers of manipulation that are out of step with 
reality (Khon, Johnson, & Hang, 2020). Nonetheless, there was a trend for sellers to be seen as more 
likely to gain in the empty-reason than in the no-reason condition [M = 3.66, SD = 0.71 vs. M = 3.53 
out of 4, SD = 0.83; t(174) = 2.06, p = .041, d = 0.17], albeit a trend that did not reach significance for 
average welfare ratings [M = 1.88, SD = 1.32 vs. M = 2.01, SD = 1.43; t(174) = 1.52, p = .13, d = 
0.10]. One possible explanation is that contemplating the buyers’ reasons for their purchases cued 
broader mentalizing that also led participants to consider the sellers’ reasons as well. 
 
Discussion 
Study 3 found that cueing participants to consider the buyers’ and traders’ reasons for their 
transactions led them to recognize that those transactions were mutually beneficial: Buyers were 20% 
less likely to be seen as losing and barters were 36% less likely to be seen as inducing no benefits to 
either party. This implicates theory of mind limits as a partial explanation for win–win denial, as 
participants who treat their preferences as reflective of reality may not recognize that others’ decisions 
are guided by their own reasons and preferences. 
In the Supplementary Materials, we report several further studies (Studies S3A–B, S4, and S5A–
B) that are consistent with Study 3. We replicated the reduction in win–win denial when the empty-
reasons condition is tested in a between-subjects setting (Study S3A); indeed, the reduction was 
considerably larger there than in the within-subjects design of Study 3, underscoring the robustness 
and magnitude of the effect. A comparable effect was also seen when more explicit, preference-based 
reasons were given (e.g., Sally bought the shirt because she saw Taylor Swift wear it) (Study S3B). 
Study S4 used a different manipulation to draw participants’ attention to the perspective of the 
people undertaking the transaction—asking participants to indicate the preferences of each party (e.g., 
indicating that the buyer preferred the goods over the money exchanged while the seller had the 
opposite preferences). This manipulation reduces win–win denial compared to a control condition, 
with this effect stronger than that in Study 3. Even here, though, participants were more prone to 
claim that buyers lose from exchanges compared to sellers, claiming that buyers “lose” about one-
fourth of the time even after explicitly stating that the buyers preferred the good over the money.    
Study S5 tested two other manipulations which further implicated theory of mind. Study S5A 
asked participants to explicitly rate welfare from the buyers’ and sellers’ perspective (e.g., “How well 
off do you think Sally believes she now is?”). As predicted by the theory of mind account, this led to 
less win–win denial compared to Study 1, although this was less effective than giving reasons. 
Study S5B, in contrast, asked participants to imagine themselves as the buyers and traders (e.g., “You 
go to Tony’s clothing store…”). On the one hand, people have high opinions of their own abilities 
(e.g., Dunning, Meyerowitz, & Holzberg, 1989) and their decision-making faculties in particular 
(Johnson & Rips, 2014, 2015; Pronin & Kugler, 2010) and might therefore be more likely to think 
themselves beneficiaries from their transactions. But the theory of mind account arguably makes the 
opposite prediction. Participants know their own preferences, which might indeed value money more 
than the good they are buying. Thus, if theory of mind limits explain the high rates of win–win denial 
in our other studies, we would expect a similar result whether transactions are framed in first-person 




Assessing relative welfare before and after a transaction is not an easy problem to solve. We can 
say, normatively, what the direction of this change will be, because people do not engage in voluntary 
transactions unless they believe they will benefit. Yet, the precise gain in welfare is elusive even to 
economists because it depends on consumers’ subjective valuation, which is difficult to measure. In 
other contexts where judgments are difficult, people often substitute the hard question for an easier 
question (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In this case, an easier question would be: Did the consumer get 
a good deal? If people use this heuristic, they may not compare the buyers’ relative welfare before and after 
the exchange, but instead the quality of the buyer’s bargain relative to other possible bargains. That is, people 
may use a bargain heuristic. 
To test this possibility, Study 4 manipulated the price of the monetary transactions, varying it from 
50% of the approximate market price, up to 150%. As the price decreases, the buyers do indeed benefit 
more, and the sellers less, relative to a higher price (in economists’ language, this changes the extent 
to which the gains from trade contribute to the consumer surplus versus the producer surplus). However, 
this does not change the economists’ conclusion that both buyers and sellers benefit from any voluntary 
transaction, regardless of the price: A high price merely indicates that the buyer and seller placed a 
relatively high valuation on the item. Thus, the bargain heuristic is one particular manifestation of a 
theory of mind error, in that thinking about the transaction from the buyers’ and sellers’ perspective 
makes plain that the quality of the bargain is not relevant to the direction of the welfare change. A failure 
in perspective-taking is a prerequisite to using this heuristic. 
If people use the “bargain” heuristic, they should no longer think that the buyers lose from 
transactions at low prices, and may even believe that the sellers lose at these prices. Conversely, if 
people endorse zero-sum transactions primarily due to mercantilism, they would often believe that 
buyers lose from transactions even when they get a good deal. Finally, if these mechanisms combine 
to produce win–win denial, buyers should be seen as losing more often than sellers at all bargain levels, 




We recruited 150 participants (Mage = 38.6; 56% female, 55% college educated) from Mechanical 
Turk; 8 were excluded from analysis based on the criterion used in previous studies. 
The procedure was the same as Study 1, except that ten items were used—five monetary purchases 
of goods and five monetary purchases of services (barter items were excluded because monetary price 
could not be manipulated). Some of the items differed from previous experiments to avoid inferences 
about price/quality trade-offs (e.g., a car purchase could not be used, because a discounted car would 
likely be assumed to be used). 
Among the five monetary purchases of goods and the five monetary purchases of services, 
participants read about one good and one service at typical market price (e.g., “Eric goes to Paul’s 
barber shop. Eric pays Paul $15 for a haircut”), as well as one each at 50%, 75%, 125%, and 150% of 
the market price (i.e., for the haircut, $8, $11, $19, or $23). Participants were not told what the market 
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price or discounts were—conditions differed only in the dollar amount of the transaction. The five 
price conditions were counterbalanced with the five different goods and five different services using 
Latin squares, so that each item was paired with one of the five price conditions for each participant, 
and items were paired equally often with price conditions across participants. 
 
Results 
Although participants were sensitive to price, believing that buyers were comparatively more likely 
to be the same or worse off when the prices were high, they continued to deny that buyers gained 
even when the price was 50% of the market price (Figure 4). This suggests that a “bargain” heuristic, 
while perhaps contributing to win–win denial, is not all there is to the story. 
To test whether price influenced judgments of buyers’ welfare, we calculated a linear contrast for 
each participant, comparing the number of times buyers were thought to have negative welfare-change 
across price levels. These contrasts were significantly positive [M = 0.63, SD = 1.50; t(141) = 4.98, p 
< .001, d = 0.42], indicating that people were likelier to think the buyers were harmed by transactions 
at higher price levels. The equivalent contrasts on the raw means were significantly negative [M = –
1.33, SD = 3.32; t(141) = –4.76, p < .001, d = 0.40], reflecting lower perceived welfare at higher price 
levels. Note that the latter result alone is appropriate according to economic theory, since the gains 
from trade are indeed apportioned more to sellers when the price is high and more to buyers when 
the price is low. But the former result is not consistent with economic theory—at no price do buyers 
regularly lose from trade, assuming that buyers voluntarily transacted at that price. 
The results for sellers were less robust. We computed linear contrasts, comparing the number of 
times sellers were thought to have positive welfare-change across price levels. These contrasts, while 
numerically positive, were not significantly different from zero [M = 0.18, SD = 1.34; t(141) = 1.57, p 
= .12, d = 0.13]. Thus, sellers were not seen as particularly likelier to benefit at higher price levels. Yet, 
this could be due to ceiling effects, since (as is obvious from Figure 4) sellers were nearly always seen 
as gaining from trades. This suspicion is confirmed by looking at the contrasts calculated on the means 
rather than number of positive welfare-change scores, which were significantly positive, to a similar 
degree as buyers’ mean scores were negative [M = 1.30, SD = 2.86; t(141) = 5.40, p < .001, d = 0.45]. 
Thus, participants correctly see prices as divvying up gains from trade between buyer and seller, but 
err in thinking that buyers often fail to benefit altogether (or even are made worse off). 
Thus, the price manipulation did affect participants’ judgments of welfare-change. But looking at 
Figure 4, the most striking finding is not the effect of price level, but the dramatic asymmetry between 
buyers and sellers at every level—regardless of price, buyers are much more likely to be perceived as 
non-beneficiaries compared to sellers. For example, at market price, buyers were deemed over six 
times likelier to be made worse-off by the transaction compared to sellers [M = 0.61, SD = 0.76 vs. 
M = 0.09, SD = 0.33 out of 2; t(141) = 7.52, p < .001, d = 0.87]. Indeed, even at 50% of the market 
price, buyers were thought nearly four times likelier to be made worse-off than sellers [M = 0.50, SD 
= 0.73 vs. M = 0.13, SD = 0.40; t(141) = 5.21, p < .001, d = 0.62]. Although the price-based trends 
suggest that people (correctly) believe that price makes a difference in allocating gains between buyer 
and seller, they frequently fail to perceive that buyers gain from trades, even at bargain prices. 
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Figure 4. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers and 
sellers across prices (from 50% to 150% of typical retail price) in Study 4. 
 
Discussion 
Study 4 tested whether a “bargain” heuristic is a plausible explanation for zero-sum thinking—
whether people tacitly substitute the question of relative welfare (before versus after a transaction) for 
relative bargain (compared to other transactions of similar goods and services). People do seem to 
calibrate their judgments of relative welfare somewhat depending on the price of the transaction—
buyers are seen as somewhat less likely to lose from trade when the purchase price is 50% rather than 
150% of the market price, and sellers somewhat less likely to benefit (though the latter trend was not 
significant). But the most striking finding is just how shallow these trends are: Nearly 40% of buyers 
were seen as failing to gain from trade even when the prices were 50% below market price—barely 
less win–win denial than in Study 1. Thus, while the “bargain” heuristic seems to play some role in 
win–win denial, it does not appear to be in the driver’s seat. 
 
General Discussion 
Voluntary transactions benefit both parties—this is a truth universally acknowledged among 
economists. Here, we showed that non-economists have grave doubts about this truth. When 
evaluating the relative welfare of buyers and sellers (in monetary exchanges) and of traders (in barters), 
people frequently claimed that some parties to the transactions were worse off afterwards—in flagrant 
violation of the commonsense insight that both parties gain from voluntary trades. Buyers were much 











either party. Overall, the overwhelming majority of participants claimed that at least some of the 
parties did not benefit from one or more exchanges (see Study 1). 
We also examined the mechanisms underlying this win–win denial, finding evidence in favor of 
two key mechanisms. First, across all studies buyers were consistently seen as less likely to benefit 
from exchange than sellers, and barters were often seen as not benefitting either party. This is 
consistent with intuitive mercantilism—the idea that a person’s welfare is determined by their monetary 
wealth, not by their command of useful goods and services. Perceived benefit flows with currency, so 
that sellers are seen as better-off, buyers as worse-off, and traders as experiencing no change. Despite 
perennial attempts to conquer mercantilist thinking by economists (e.g., Bastiat, 2007/1845, Smith, 
1999/1776), this sort of thinking may be so cognitively natural that even extensive economics 
education does not stamp it out. In our experiments, mercantilist thinking also manifested in a smaller 
degree of win–win denial when payments were described in terms of time rather than money (Study 
2; see also Study S2 in the Supplementary Materials and Johnson & Park, 2019 for related results in 
the domain of charitable giving). 
Second, win–win denial seems to be exacerbated by issues in our theory of mind. Specifically, 
people are naïve realists, making a perspective-taking error in which they interpret their own 
preferences as ground truth, neglecting that others have different preferences and reasons for their 
actions. Merely reminding people that the buyers and traders had reasons for their choices (even empty 
reasons such as “Mary wanted the chocolate bar”) reduced the incidence of win–win denial (Study 3; 
see also Study S3 in the Supplementary Materials). Other results reported in the Supplementary 
Materials were also consistent with this idea. Making the preference of buyers and traders more salient 
reduced win–win denial (Study S4), as did asking participants to rate the parties’ perceived gain or loss 
(Study S5). Together, these results suggest that people do not spontaneously reflect on the fact that 
parties to exchanges have reasons for their behavior, leading them to discount potential gains from 
trade. 
We also addressed two other possible mechanisms. One possibility is evolutionary mismatch—that 
we were adapted well for exchange in our ancestral environment, but not the modern global economy 
(e.g., Pinker, 2003). One specific version of this proposal is that coalitional rivalry causes us to be 
averse to international trade (Boyer & Petersen, 2018)—hence the talk of “winners” and “losers.” 
Weak versions of this approach are highly plausible—for instance, noting that people likely have poor 
intuitions about exchange in our complex global marketplace with complex and opaque chains of 
causation and with money-mediated transactions poorly suited to our adapted intuitions (Pinker, 
2003). But some predictions of the evolutionary mismatch approach seem ill-equipped to explain our 
data. First, people should be readily perceive barters as positive-sum, since we are thought to be 
adapted for like-kind exchange (e.g., Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Fiske, 1992). But we see, if anything, 
the opposite finding, with rampant zero-sum thinking about barters. Second, this account plausibly 
implies that our ancestors would have assigned value to goods but not to worthless pieces of paper, 
but this seems to predict the of our finding that buyers (who gain goods but give up money) are seen 
as worse-off than sellers. Finally, if coalitional rivalry accounts for aversion to trade, then we should 
see win–win denial at the level of countries but not of individuals, in contrast to the current results. It 
is, however, eminently possible that coalitional rivalry exacerbates at the international level the win–
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win denial and zero-sum thinking we already see at the individual level (indeed, this is consistent with 
findings in Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2019). Thus, although we agree that our evolutionary past has not 
endowed us with the tools for understanding modern economic exchange, it is unclear that 
evolutionary mismatch is the main driver of zero-sum thinking (Johnson, 2018).  
Another possible driver of win–win denial is a “bargain” heuristic, substituting the question of 
relative welfare (before and after the exchange) for bargain quality (relative to other deals). This would 
predict that buyers are seen as worse-off and buyers as better-off when the prices are high, but that 
buyers would be seen as better-off and sellers worse-off when the prices are low. In Study 4, we did 
find that people view sellers as benefitting at buyers’ expense to a greater extent when prices are high, 
but even at bargain prices buyers were still often seen as worse-off, and much more frequently than 
sellers. Thus, although such heuristics might contribute to win–win denial, they do not seem to be the 
root cause. 
 
Is Win–Win Denial Rational? 
The conclusion that voluntary transactions benefit both parties rests on assumptions, and can 
therefore admit exceptions when these assumptions do not hold. Voluntary trades are mutually 
beneficial when the parties are performing rational, selfish cost–benefit calculations and when there 
are no critical asymmetries in information (e.g., fraud). There are several ways that violations of these 
assumptions could lead a transaction not to be win–win. Consumers could have inconsistent 
preferences over time, such that something believed to be beneficial at one time proves non-beneficial 
later on (e.g., liking a shirt when one buys it in the store, but growing weary of it after a couple months). 
Consumers could have self-control failures, making an impulse purchase that proved unwise in the 
longer term. Consumers could have other-regarding preferences, buying something that benefits 
someone else but not oneself. Finally, the consumer could be deceived by a seller who knows that the 
product will not satisfy their preferences (e.g., a crooked used-car salesman). 
These are of course more than theoretical possibilities—many demonstrations of human 
irrationality have been demonstrated in lab and field studies (Frederick et al., 2009; Loewenstein & 
Prelec, 1992; Malmandier & Tate, 2005 among many others). The key question is whether the real-
world prevalence of irrationality and fraud is sufficient to justify the conclusion that ordinary consumer 
transactions—like those tested here—are so riddled with incompetence that our participants were 
right to deny that transactions are typically win–win. We respond to this challenge with four points.  
First, an empirical point. It is not just the magnitude of win–win denial of interest here, but how 
this magnitude responds to our experimental manipulations. It is hard to see how the effects of time-
framing or cueing participants to buyers’ reasons would produce the effects that they do, independent 
of the mechanisms we have proposed for win–win denial (namely mercantilism and theory of mind). 
It is especially difficult to see why people would claim that barters make neither party better-off if the 
issue is exploitation. Thus, even if the magnitude of the effects is reasonable in some conditions of 
some of our experiments because people’s intuitions are attuned to the (allegedly) large extent of 
market failures, some of the patterns we see and the differences in these patterns across conditions 
seem to necessitate the mechanisms we propose. 
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Second, a sanity check. We tested intuitions about a range of typical consumer transactions in our 
items, finding consistent effects across items (see Part A of the Supplementary Materials). Is it really 
that plausible that people are impulsively hiring plumbers or that their hair stylists are routinely 
fraudsters? If such ordinary transactions are actually making consumers worse-off, it is very difficult 
to see how the rise of market economies has brought prosperity to much of the world—indeed, if 
win–win denial correctly describes most consumer transactions, one should predict a negative 
relationship between well-being and economic activity (contradicting the large association between 
subjective well-being and per capita income across countries; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2013). In our 
view, one can acknowledge occasional consumer irrationalities, while not thereby concluding that all 
or most market activity is irrational, which, we submit, would fly in the face both of economic science 
and common sense. Actually, to claim that consumers are consistently irrational threatens paradox: 
The more one thinks that consumers are irrational in general, the more one must believe that 
participants in the current experiments are (rationally) attuned to their own irrationality. 
Third, a call for reflection. Economists tend to be much more accepting of the benefits of free 
markets compared to non-economists, and this is true even though economists tend to be to the 
political left of the general public (Caplan, 2002). If a (non-economist) reader’s intuitions are aligned 
with our participants—believing that a very large proportion of ordinary consumer transactions are 
zero- or negative-sum—it is worth considering the possibility that this reader is herself falling prey to 
the same biases as other non-economists. (Indeed, Kahan et al., 2017, found that the most numerate 
individuals were the most skilled at distorting data to support their ideologically-derived conclusions.) 
This is not of course to say that there are no reasonable grounds for skepticism: simply that non-
economist readers may want to consider the possibility that economists are genuine experts. 
Fourth, a philosophical point. Our central project is an empirical one, not a normative one. We 
find that win–win denial is ubiquitous and we provided empirically-driven explanations of where it 
comes from. The proper interpretation of these results—as grievous error or knowing wisdom—must 
be situated relative to the reader’s own view of the ground truth on these issues. If, reaching the end 
of this article, the reader believes that markets are indeed in perpetual failure due to human frailty, it 
is still useful to know that people are (perhaps paradoxically) not so frail that they fail to notice this. 
The purpose of this article would be, then, documenting a belief rather than a mistake. 
 
Explanations of Intuitive Mercantilism 
Although we have identified intuitive mercantilism as one of the underlying mechanisms of zero-
sum thinking, we have not explained where mercantilism itself comes from: Why is this belief system, 
as opposed to Smithian political economy, psychologically intuitive? We do not provide direct 
evidence in this article, but here we consider three possible (and not mutually exclusive) theories—a 
heuristic for value, a competition for relative rank, and a self-control mechanism. These correspond roughly to the 
classic functions of money (Jevons, 1875)—as a unit of account, medium of exchange, and store of value. 
 
Heuristic for value. According to mainstream microeconomics, consumers purchase a product 
when its subjective value (the utility the consumer can expect to gain) is greater than its opportunity 
cost (the value of the next-most-desirable alternative). These are situations that produce consumer 
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surplus (e.g., Mankiw, 2017) and are therefore win–win. We need not assume that consumers are 
explicitly performing such calculations when purchasing products. But in our task—and any real-world 
situation in which people deliberate whether a transaction makes two parties better-off or worse-off—
we are asking people to calculate consumer surplus, the difference between value and opportunity cost. 
We speculate that people use objective and salient monetary costs, rather than subjective values, as 
heuristics for valuation. Value estimations are difficult—for example, although people can make 
consistent relative value judgments, their absolute value judgments are all over the map (e.g., Ariely, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003). Substituting monetary costs for subjective value is likely attractive due 
to money’s function as a unit of account, used to denominate transactions and facilitate comparability of 
value across goods. Because each dollar is equivalent to every other dollar, it is useful to express the 
value of goods in monetary terms even when bartering. Ultimately, value in economic theory is imbued 
in a subjective currency of personal utility, but such private and subjective notions are necessarily more 
nebulous than the socially shared system of prices, denominated in an objective, monetary currency. 
It is thus plausible that monetary costs would take the role of subjective value in much economic 
discourse. Yet, this is a fundamental mistake. Since consumer surplus simply is the difference between 
a product’s subjective value and its (monetary) cost, this heuristic leads to the conclusion that positive 
consumer surplus is impossible! 
How does this account of mercantilism relate to the other mechanisms we documented in this 
article? It is linked to theory-of-mind errors as a manifestation of the “physical fallacy” described by 
economists (Sowell, 1980)—the idea that goods have precisely one value at a given time, when value 
is in fact subjective and differs across people and across time. In our experiments, we found that 
people often fail to think about buyers’ subjective reasons and preferences as drivers of (utility-
increasing behaviors), instead appearing to substitute their own judgments of value. The idea that 
people use monetary costs as a heuristic for value suggests that these judgments of value are 
themselves tied unduly to these monetary costs. Thus, a mercantilist heuristic for value is one particular 
way to fill in the gap left by this perspective-taking error, but not the only logical possibility. 
It is also linked with the bargain heuristic, but these are subtly different. The bargain heuristic 
substitutes judgments of welfare (comparing utility after an exchange to before the exchange) for 
judgments of bargain quality (comparing utility after an exchange to other counterfactual exchange 
opportunities). This need not be tied to money at all—in Study 4 we manipulated the exchange’s quality 
compared to other exchanges by altering the price, but this heuristic could apply as easily to barters. 
In contrast, the mercantilist heuristic for value substitutes judgments of utility or subjective value for 
monetary costs or prices, as a common (albeit problematic) yardstick for value. 
 
Competition for relative rank. Economists from Smith onwards conceptualize markets as 
positive-sum because gains from trade and economic growth can lead to more consumption for 
everyone. But we may be more plausibly evolved for Darwinian rather than Smithian competition. In 
Darwinian competitions, it is our relative standing that matters, as in competitions for dominance 
within a group or for mating. Indeed, there is evidence that people are often more interested in their 
relative standing rather than their absolute level of consumption (e.g., Boyce, Brown, & Moore, 2010; 
Clark, Frijters, & Shields, 2008). Frank (2005, 2012) argues that these two forms of consumption co-
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exist within the modern economy, with the utility of some goods depend on the absolute consumption 
level (e.g., vacation time) and others on relative consumption (e.g., house size). 
This idea by itself does not explain mercantilism, since both absolute and relative consumption 
levels are raised by increasing consumption, although some goods (e.g., expensive clothing or cars) 
may be more useful in the relative status competition than others (Veblen, 1899). However, in some 
status competitions it may not be relative actual or realized consumption, but relative potential 
consumption that matters. For example, Cold War era anxiety over economic growth in the Soviet 
Union was not motivated by jealousy over the perceived luxuries with which Soviet citizens lived 
(realized consumption), but out of fear of the military power that economic growth could bring (potential 
consumption). Likewise, it serves the interest of a potential romantic partner to seek out mates with more 
resources (potential consumption) rather than spendthrift consumption in the present. Indeed, to the 
extent that conspicuous consumption sends a positive signal, it is because it demonstrates that 
resources are so abundant that even wholly useless consumptive acts are painless (Zahavi, 1975). 
Money is a measure of potential consumption because it is a medium of exchange—it can be 
exchanged for many different consumption goods. If you need to buy a house, pay your child’s 
university tuition, or start a war with another country, it is easier to do so if you store your wealth in 
dollars than in cans of lima beans, because dollars can be more readily converted into houses, tuition, 
munitions—or indeed lima beans—than the reverse. Hence, to the extent that people are interested 
in relative standing rather than absolute consumption, and to the extent that relative standing is 
measured in potential consumption rather than realized consumption, people would privilege stored, money-
denominated wealth over consumption in their notion of value. Thus, accumulating money can take 
on value not as a way to facilitate consumption, but as an end in itself. Intuitive as this may seem, it 
actually turns standard economics on its head: Savings and investment in standard economics are 
motivated by the desire to defer or smooth consumption over one’s lifetime, not as ends in themselves 
(Friedman, 1957; Modigliani & Brumberg, 1954). 
 
Self-control mechanism. Theories of mental accounting have documented many normative 
errors in how people think about money, for instance ignoring the fungibility of money across 
different kinds of mental accounts (e.g., Thaler, 1985). For example, people often hold money in low-
interest savings account at the same time that they have higher-interest debts. One explanation for 
such behaviors is that they are self-control mechanisms—putting money into a savings account each 
month ensures that it is not spent, and hence may actually lead to better outcomes in the long-run 
(assuming that the consumer correctly judges that spending this money is not in their overall interest). 
Mercantilism is a particularly deep kind of error, not in our mental accounting of money but in 
our mental accounting of subjective value or utility, in substituting money for these more nebulous, 
subjective notions. In systematically underestimating consumer surplus, mercantilism may help us to 
restrict our own spending, preserving resources that are liquid and storable over time. It would 
therefore be interesting to test whether mercantilist intuitions to be strongest among individuals high 




Although this article has identified the phenomenon of win–win denial and documented the 
contributions of several mechanisms, there is still much to learn about this phenomenon, its causes 
and consequences, and its boundary conditions. 
First, a further contributing factor may be beliefs about sellers’ power to dupe buyers 
(Bhattacharjee et al., 2017; Vohs, Baumeister, & Chin, 2007), for instance due to sellers’ greater 
knowledge about the products. It is unclear to what extent this can account for the results of the 
current studies, since if anything participants were more prone to believing that buyers were made 
worse-off by purchases of goods (e.g., olive oil, where sellers typically have little expertise) than 
services (e.g., plumbing, where sellers typically have high expertise; see Part A of the Supplementary 
Materials for item-level results). Still, beliefs about information asymmetries could account for some 
portion of win–win denial and would make several predictions, for instance about how participants’ 
judgments would shift when buyer vs. seller expertise or motives are manipulated, for product 
categories that lend versus do not lend themselves to expertise, or when information about the product 
or seller’s reputation are available. For example, in situations where the buyer has more product 
knowledge than the seller, the typical mercantilist pattern should be attenuated or reversed to the 
extent that perceived information asymmetries drive win–win denial. 
Second, a related reason participants might deny that buyers gain from trade would be denial that 
the buyers actually know their own interests—a belief associated with hard paternalism or the desire 
to block transactions for the consumer’s own good even when the transaction is voluntary and the 
consumer is knowledgeable (Mill, 1859). The finding that participants are less prone to thinking that 
the consumer believes herself to be worse-off rather than actually worse-off (Study S5A) is consistent 
with this possibility. If this is the case, then the alignment between the buyers’ and participants’ 
conception of the buyer’s interest would be a key moderating variable on win–win denial. In extreme 
cases, participants who believe that many people do not know their own interests might even claim 
that “transactions” without a counterparty (e.g., Robinson Crusoe deciding between fish and game for 
dinner) are welfare-depleting. Alternatively, people might rely on different mechanisms entirely for 
contemplating such non-social “transactions with nature.” 
A specific version of this idea is that asymmetries between buyers and sellers could result from 
differential beliefs about anticipated regret (Loomes & Sugden, 1982). Perhaps perhaps people believe 
that buyers have poor self-control whereas sellers do not have this problem, leading to frequent 
buyer’s remorse but rare seller’s remorse. Alternatively, if a transaction is seen as a risky gamble, then 
even if the gamble has positive expected utility (because the possible gains are likelier or more valuable 
than the possible losses), loss aversion may lead the possibility of anticipated regret to outweigh the 
possibility of anticipated satisfaction. This could lead to negative expected “emotional utility” even if 
the transaction is likely to be materially beneficial; yet sellers should not experience regret, since loss 
aversion is not found for goods given up “as intended” (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). However, 
this explanation is somewhat at odds with our experimental results: If sophisticated inferences about 
future mental states underlie beliefs that buyers lose from their transactions, then cueing participants 
to think about buyers’ mental states should make these beliefs even stronger, contrary to our findings. 
Moreover, although sellers should not experience loss aversion for goods given up “as intended,” this 
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logic also applies to buyers, since money is given up as intended in these exchanges—there is no loss 
aversion for money (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). 
Third, participants beliefs about firms’ costs may contribute to the belief that sellers are especially 
likely to benefit from transactions. Prior work on price fairness has found that consumers have 
dubious beliefs about firms’ cost structures, for instance neglecting the role of inflation and attributing 
price differences across retailers to profits rather than costs (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003). If 
consumers neglect many of the costs sellers face and their associated benefits (e.g., convenience, speed, 
and customer service), they may overestimate sellers’ profits, in turn triggering resentment and zero-
sum thinking (Bhattacharjee et al., 2017). This may fit with a broader neglect of the benefits provided 
by economic middlemen who sit between producers and consumers (Bastiat, 2007/1850). One 
direction for future work would be to test how sellers’ cost structure impacts perceptions both of firm 
profitability and zero-sum thinking. For example, when fixed costs are high, competition can drive 
the price below the firm’s average cost—would people believe that firms are benefitting at buyers’ 
expense in this situation? Or even if the firm was demonstrably selling below marginal cost? 
Fourth, people may be more or less prone to win–win denial depending on the competitive 
environment in which the seller sits. According to standard economic theory, firms can extract a larger 
portion of the surplus value created by an exchange when they have few competitors. For example, a 
recent report from the US Food and Drug Administration analyzing the effects of deregulation in the 
generic drug market found that generic drugs manufactured by only one firm (i.e., a monopoly) are 
priced on average around 69% the price of the name-brand drug, with prices declining as the number 
of manufacturers increases, to 56% (for 2 producers), 44%, 27%, 18%, and 10% (for 6 producers), to 
less than 5% of the name-brand drug price for more than 10 producers (Conrad & Lutter, 2019).  
Thus, manipulating the market structure (number of competitors) and other sources of market 
power (e.g., threat of new entrants; Porter, 1979) , and availability of market prices from competitors 
may all shape the extent of win–win denial. We would expect win–win denial to be stronger in more 
monopolistic markets and in competitive markets when the seller’s price is high relative to competitors 
(see Bolton et al., 2003). Economic theory says that even in such cases, win–win denial is a mistake 
because consumer still benefit (albeit to a smaller degree) from individual transactions as they would 
not make the exchange if it produced negative marginal utility. However, we also suspect that most 
people overestimate the prevalence of true monopolies and neglect the threat of new entrants or 
substitute products, further exacerbating this problem. It would be particularly striking if people 
continue to believe that firms benefit at the expense of consumers under highly competitive 
conditions, as economic theory says that profits are competed away under perfect competition, leading 
to no net gain on the part of sellers (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). 
Fifth, the framing of the exchanges may exacerbate win–win denial. Mental accounting theory 
(Thaler, 1985) distinguishes between the utility of consumption (i.e., eating the chocolate bar or driving 
the car one has bought) versus the utility of the transaction itself (i.e., giving up money in exchange 
for the product). Perhaps asking participants about who benefits from exchanges leads to a focus on 
transaction utility at the expense of consumption utility. This is consistent with the finding in Study 4 
that better “bargains” (i.e., high in transaction utility) are perceived as at least somewhat more 
beneficial to buyers. Moreover, whereas the buyer’s consumption utility will occur in the future, the 
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seller’s economic gains from the trade itself occur immediately. In that case, focusing attention on the 
consumption experience itself may lead people to more readily recognize that transactions tend to 
benefit buyers as well as sellers. 
Sixth, these results document a general bias in economic thinking, but it is one with applications 
to many economic policy issues. Anti-immigrant sentiment may be driven in part by the belief that 
there is a fixed number of jobs that are “taken” by immigrants (Esses et al., 2001; Louis et al., 2013), 
neglecting that immigrants are not only workers but also consumers. Similarly, the anti-trade sentiment 
recently seen in U.S. politics seems to be driven by the belief that other countries are “winning” at 
trade, whereas the U.S. is “losing.” In a separate project, we demonstrate that win–win denial about 
international trade is, if anything, even more rampant than the effects we document in this article 
(Johnson et al., 2019). Understanding more broadly how win–win denial affects voters’ attitudes may 
be valuable. 
Seventh, further work into the psychological origins of mercantilism would be valuable both in 
basic scientific value and in potential applications. For example, understanding the reasons why 
currency is over-valued may be useful for understanding the psychological differences among various 
currencies and payment methods (e.g., cash versus credit cards) and for the design of new currencies, 
such as cryptocurrencies. 
Finally, whereas our existing data and speculations about potential moderators have been driven 
by theoretical concerns about underlying mechanisms, an important practical project is understanding 
how to frame economics in a way that minimizes errors in economic thinking. Thus, seeing how these 
manipulations work in conjunction, and how they might be exported to more real-world rather than 
laboratory conditions, can be useful for both policy and economics education. 
 
Further Puzzles 
These results partly resolve one puzzle—when and why people believe that economic transactions 
are zero-sum—but raise several further puzzles when taken together with the broader literature in 
behavioral and traditional economics. 
First, if people really believed that so many consumer transactions are zero-sum, then why doesn’t 
economic activity grind to a halt? One possibility could be that people have more accurate views that 
their own economic transactions are positive-sum, with win–win denial only a powerful force for 
evaluating hypothetical or third-person transactions such as those we study here. After all, we find 
that better perspective-taking reduces win–win denial, and surely we are capable of taking our own 
perspectives? Perhaps surprisingly, we find in a separate project (Johnson, Zhang, & Keil, 2021) that 
consumers often claim that their own past transactions make them either worse-off or no better off, 
and even make similar claims about planned future transactions. Thus, there appears to be a striking 
attitude–behavior gap here: Whereas people’s lay theories of exchange seem to produce strong 
intuitions that consumers are often made worse-off by their purchases, these attitudes do not seem to 
manifest (in most cases, fortunately) in their actions. Perhaps this gap is driven by differences in what 
is considered relevant when evaluating exchanges more abstractly from a distance versus more 
concretely from a nearby temporal perspective (Trope & Liberman, 2010), with the latter conditions 
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prompting more thoughts about the consumption experience itself (see “Future Directions” above). 
In any case, we think this is a genuine puzzle deserving of further research. 
Second—and exacerbating the first puzzle—some transactions really are zero- or negative-sum, 
yet people make them anyway (Camerer, 2003). For example, poker games are zero-sum in that the 
winner’s gains exactly balance out the other players’ losses. Given that people have some private 
information about their skill, players unlikely to win should be unwilling to play since the expected 
value of playing is negative. Of greater economic consequence, ordinary investors making short-term 
trades in the hope of beating the market are engaging in zero-sum trades while neglecting the (likely 
greater) information that the party on the other end of the transaction has. Such willingness to take 
zero-sum bets is known as the Groucho Marx theorem, after the comedian’s observation that he would 
never join a club willing to take him as a member. Thus, the puzzle that consumers are willing to make 
positive-sum transactions despite judging them to be zero-sum becomes even more mysterious, as 
they will even make genuinely zero- or negative-sum transactions. One important question for future 
research is whether people can recognize the distinction between positive- and zero-sum transactions. 
If people treat all economic transactions as zero-sum by default, yet learn that frequent transactions 
are required to gain life’s necessities, then perhaps people become numbed to these genuinely zero-
sum transactions and do not adequately appreciate their drawbacks. Further, zero-sum transactions 
like day-trading are made under uncertainty and may be especially susceptible to an illusion of skill. 
Third, these results are in seeming tenson with demonstrations that people tend to overestimate 
how much others are willing to pay (Frederick, 2012) and how strong other’s preferences are (Jung, 
Moon, & Nelson, 2020). The results of Study 3 seem to suggest that people do not spontaneously 
recognize that willingness-to-pay is evidence of a strong preference, without cueing to consider that 
people have reasons for their choices. One possible interpretation of this body of evidence is that, 
despite believing that others’ preferences are stronger than their own, they supply their own preferences 
when evaluating the rationality of others’ exchanges and only recognize the relevance of others’ 
preferences when cued to do so. However, this interpretation is speculative and requires further study. 
Fourth, whereas economists insist that the true cost of something is the next-best-alternative that 
is given up (its opportunity cost), people often seem to neglect opportunity costs. For example, when a 
choice is framed as buying a product versus not buying it, people are more likely to make the purchase 
than when the choice is instead framed as buying a product versus keeping its cost for other purchases 
(Frederick et al., 2009). Subsequent research (Spiller, 2011) has therefore examined when opportunity 
costs are neglected versus considered (e.g., when resource constraints are more salient) and who is 
most likely to consider them (e.g., consumers high in propensity to plan). In Study 4, people were 
more likely to deny that buyers benefited from transactions when prices were high, relative to implicit 
market prices. This demonstrates that people naturally account for reference prices even when they 
are not provided explicitly and even when they are not normatively relevant to the task. This form of 
opportunity cost consideration may merit further investigation. 
 
Folk Economics 
Since the beginning of professional economics, economists have complained bitterly about 
people’s economic ignorance. Recent survey data comparing the views of economists and laypeople 
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suggests that little progress has been made since the time of Adam Smith—even though economic 
science has advanced greatly, our intuitive theories seem to be stuck in time (Caplan, 2007). The 
ubiquity of zero-sum language among politicians from the Elizabethan era until today betray a 
depressing lack of progress in economic understanding. 
We view the current studies as a step toward a systematic study of people’s intuitive theories of 
economics (Boyer & Petersen, 2018; Leiser & Shemesh, 2018). Humans have sophisticated intuitive 
theories of intuitive psychology (Apperly, 2010), physics (Carey, 2009), and biology (Keil, 1994), and 
although these intuitive theories often diverge from scientific theories (Shtulman, 2017), humans seem 
to have some innate capacities to understand these domains in an adaptive manner. But to the extent 
that innate ideas influence our intuitive economics, these innate ideas come from a radically different 
evolutionary past—the principles of physics, biology, and psychology have not changed much over 
the millennia, but the principles of economics certainly have. Modern economies are mediated by 
money rather than barter; they are far more specialized and globalized; and as a result we typically 
trade with people we do not know. If we have any innate economic intuitions, they developed in a 
world of barter with close acquaintances in a much less specialized economy. Our modern and 
ancestral economies both depended largely on trust, but many of the cues that trigger trust are missing 
from modern markets. One possibility is that, lacking an autonomous set of folk-economic intuitions, 
we instead rely on domain-specific folk-psychological intuitions, such as a bias for intentional 
explanations (Johnson & Nagatsu, 2021; Leiser et al., 2010; Rosset & Kelemen, 2008). 
Mapping our intuitive economic concepts and theories—whether they are best accounted for in 
evolutionary or heuristic terms—is an important project for ongoing research. Despite the nascent 
state of folk economics, there has been a recent flurry of research into this topic (e.g., Leiser & 
Shemesh, 2018). Boyer and Petersen (2018) review a number of folk-economic beliefs and analyze 
these beliefs in terms of an evolutionary framework. Although we are not bullish on the prospects of 
evolutionary psychology to explain zero-sum thinking or aversion to trade for the reasons given above, 
we are enthusiastic about this line of inquiry more generally. For example, laypeople are known to be 
far more skeptical about the economic impact of immigration compared to economists (Caplan, 2007), 
and evolutionary accounts in terms of coalitional rivalry are well-suited to explaining this difference.  
 
Practical Implications 
Democracy involves a trade-off—political leaders must be responsive to people’s expressed 
interests, limiting the range of potential self-interested choices they can make (Bueno de Mesquita, 
2003). But the policies we get in place of dictatorship will not be effective if people do not in fact 
know what is in their interest (Brennan, 2016; Caplan, 2007). Thus, if democracy is to be an effective 
institution for maximizing everyone’s well-being, it is critical that voters be informed not only about 
the narrow issues of the day, but perhaps more importantly about the fundamental principles 
governing the economy. 
No one knows what populist politicians really think about trade. Perhaps they do not really believe 
that it is zero-sum. But they surely say so, and the current research shows, regrettably, that they have 
good game-theoretic reasons for it: Win–win denial is a pervasive element in human psychology, and 
is equally prevalent on the political left and right (see Part C in the Supplementary Materials). Their 
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ability to harness this populist sentiment is surely one source of their political power, with all the policy 
consequences that entails. Moreover, in a separate set of studies, we find that mercantilism plays a 
powerful role in anti-trade sentiments as well, and can lead international trade to be deemed immoral 
(Johnson et al., 2019). 
We may not know how to solve public policy, but at least we now have a good idea about why 
many people oppose free trade and open immigration: Not only do trade and immigration harness in-
group bias (see Caplan, 2007), but they also violate the logic of a zero-sum game—if we allow China 
and Mexico to get part of the pie, then the part left for us will be smaller. The moderating role of 
economics knowledge may be one source of encouragement, and highlights the importance of 
emphasizing basic principles in economics courses, without losing students in mathematical 
formalisms. But perhaps the experimental moderators uncovered here—interventions that emphasize 
the mental states of buyers, but de-emphasize currency—are the most promising route to attenuating 
zero-sum thinking in the classroom and in the political arena. 
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Part A: Study 1 Stimuli and Results Details 
 
 Means Transaction Types 




Jenny goes to Anne's grocery store. Jenny pays 
Anne $8 for a bottle of olive oil. 0.51 1.61 46.5% 34.9% 4.7% 
Sam goes to Matt's car dealership. Sam pays 
Matt $33,000 for a Toyota. –0.02 3.09 52.3% 39.5% 0.0% 
Mary goes to Jack’s supermarket. She pays Jack 
$2 for a chocolate bar. 0.65 1.19 46.5% 27.9% 7.0% 
Sally goes to Tony’s clothing store. She pays 
Tony $30 for a shirt. 0.42 2.16 53.5% 38.4% 4.7% 
Eric goes to Paul's barber shop. Eric pays Paul 
$15 for a haircut. 1.10 1.92 60.5% 19.8% 2.3% 
Jane goes to Anna’s massage parlor. Jane pays 
Anna $60 for a 1 hour massage. 1.35 2.07 67.4% 17.4% 1.2% 
Kevin goes to Betty's pet grooming center. 
Kevin pays Betty $45 for his dog to be 
groomed. 
0.66 2.23 57.0% 29.1% 2.3% 
Amy goes to David’s plumbing company. Amy 
pays David $130 for her shower to be fixed. 0.81 2.36 59.3% 31.4% 2.3% 
Barter Transactions Traders Win–Win Win–Lose Zero–Zero 
Mark goes to his neighbor Fred. Mark trades his 
bottle of soy sauce for Fred's bottle of vinegar. 0.55 31.4% 15.1% 43.0% 
Angela goes to her friend Clair’s house. Angela 
trades her pencil for Clair’s eraser. 0.38 32.6% 18.6% 32.6% 
Maria goes to her cousin Ivy’s house. Maria 
trades her Kate Spate crossbody bag for Ivy’s 
Michael Kors crossbody bag. 
0.63 27.9% 29.1% 34.9% 
Vivian goes to her colleague Tommy’s office. 
She trades her Burger King hamburger for 
Tommy’s McDonald’s hamburger. 
0.46 29.1% 25.6% 37.2% 
 
Table S1. Study 1 Stimuli and Results Details. 
Note. Entries in the “Means” columns are the means for buyers and sellers (for the monetary transactions) and for traders (averaged across the 
two parties for barters). Entries in the “Transaction Types” columns are the proportion of times that participants categorized each transaction 
as win–win (positive scores for both parties), win–lose (for monetary transactions, positive scores for the seller and negative scores for the buyer; 
for barters, positive scores for one party and negative scores for the other), or zero–zero (scores of zero for both parties), calculated as in Table 
1 in the main text. No other transaction type had greater than 7% prevalence for any item (see Table 1 in the main text for aggregated data). 
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Part B: Supplementary Studies 
 
Study S1: Replication of Study 1 with “Benefit” Wording 
 
One potential concern about our studies is that participants are misinterpreting the terms “better 
off” and “worse off.” These terms are used by economists to refer to improvements and decrements 
in an individual’s overall welfare. However, in common parlance these terms might be used at times 
to refer to specifically financial well-being, as opposed to overall well-being. If participants are 
misinterpreting the terms in this way, it is no surprise that they would look like mercantilists, 
“overvaluing” money, since they interpret the question as referring only to money. 
To rule out this concern, we used an alternative phrasing of the key dependent measure, asking if 
the buyers, sellers, and traders “benefited” from the transactions. This wording in fact stacks the deck 
in the opposite direction, since one could (in principle) answer this question affirmatively if one thinks 
a buyer benefitted to some degree but not to an extent worth the cost—such a buyer still “benefited” 
from the transaction, just not on balance. Thus, although we anticipated that people would be more 
likely to give affirmative responses to this question overall, we should still see the same asymmetries 
among buyers, sellers, and traders seen in Study 1. 
 
Methods. We recruited 100 participants (Mage = 37.6, 62% female, 55% college educated) from 
Mechanical Turk; 15 were excluded from analysis based on the criterion used in the other studies. 
The method was identical to Study 1, except that participants were asked “To what extent do you 
think [buyer / seller / trader] benefited from this transaction?” for each transaction party, instead of the 
Study 1 phrasing of “How well off do you think [buyer / seller / trader] now is?” The scale remained 
anchored at –5 (“Worse than before”), 0 (“Same as before”), and 5 (“Better than before”). 
 
Results and Discussion. As shown in Figure S1, participants’ welfare-change ratings were indeed 
more positive than in Study 1, reflecting the question asking about benefits without mentioning costs. 
But critically, the asymmetries among buyers, sellers, and traders remained large in magnitude. 
Buyers were seen as losing from the transaction much more often than sellers [M = 1.21, SD = 
1.62 vs. M = 0.35, SD = 0.77 out of 8; t(84) = 5.15, p < .001, d = 0.68], and this trend was also reflected 
in the mean welfare-change scores [M = 1.88, SD = 1.52 vs. M = 2.93, SD = 1.34; t(84) = 7.44, p < 
.001, d = 0.73]. While these asymmetries are somewhat less pronounced compared to Study 1, they 
are large in magnitude and reflect a general concern that buyers fail to benefit from their purchases, 
which we have also seen in every other study reported in this article. 
Also mirroring other studies, traders were much more assigned zero-change scores [M = 1.32, SD 
= 2.04 out of 8] much more often than buyers [M = 0.19, SD = 0.92 out of 8; t(84) = 5.42, p < .001, 
d = 0.71] or sellers [M = 0.16, SD = 0.91 out of 8; t(84) = 5.42, p < .001, d = 0.73]. This also resulted 
in lower mean welfare-change scores for traders compared to monetary transaction parties (collapsing 
across buyers and sellers) [M = 1.21, SD = 1.34 vs. M = 2.41, SD = 1.28; t(84) = 7.81, p < .001, d = 
0.92]. This confirms that traders are really seen as failing to benefit from their transactions, not merely 
as being no “better off” financially afterwards.  
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Figure S1. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders in Study 1. 
 
Although participants are less likely to deny that buyers “benefit” than that they are made “better 
off” by their purchases, they still are much more likely to say that buyers, rather than sellers, are harmed 
by transactions. Likewise, although people are somewhat likelier to say that traders “benefited” from 
their barters rather than are made “better off,” they are far likelier to say that barters fail to benefit 
either party compared to monetary transactions. Thus, the key asymmetries documented throughout 
the studies—and offered as one key piece of evidence for mercantilist intuitions—are not an artifact 
of the way the dependent measure is worded. 
 
Study S2: Between-Subjects Replication of Study 2 
 
A second piece of evidence for mercantilist thinking—beyond the asymmetries among buyers, 
sellers, and traders—is that reframing transactions in terms of time rather than money tends to reduce 
the asymmetries between buyer and seller. This follows from mercantilism, which is the systematic 
tendency to overvalue money relative to the goods and services it can purchase. Sellers are seen as 
benefitting because they gain money (overvalued relative to the goods they give up) while buyers are 
seen as losing because they gain goods (undervalued relative to the money they give up). When money 
is made less salient, it should attenuate these intuitions and reduce asymmetries between buyers and 











Study S2 aimed to go beyond Study 2 in two respects. First, it used a between-subjects designs. 
Specifically, Study 2A design was identical to Study 1 except that, rather than framing all purchases in 
terms of money, it framed them in terms of time (as in the time-frame condition of Study 2). That is, 
comparing Study S2A to Study 1 is equivalent to testing the effect of money-frame versus time-frame 
(tested within-subjects in Study 2) in a between-subjects design. 
Second, Study S2B tested a money-plus-time framing in which both the monetary and time value 
were specified. This helps to tease apart whether the salutary effects of time-framing are due to 
mentioning time, per se, or instead avoiding the mention of money. According to mercantilism it is 
the latter avoidance of money-talk that produces the attenuation of the asymmetries between buyer 
and seller. Thus, we would expect Study S2B to look more like Study 1 than like Study S2A. 
 
Methods. We recruited 199 participants (Mage = 34.4, 55% female, 47% college educated) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 99 for Study S2A and N = 100 for Study S2B); 55 were excluded 
from analysis based on the criterion used in the other studies. 
Study S2A used the same design as Study 1, except every item appeared in the time-frame used in 
Study 2. That is, the buyers’ side of each monetary transaction was described in terms of labor, as was 
one of the traders for each of the barter. For example, whereas an item in the money-frame used in 
Study 1 read “Sally goes to Tony’s clothing store. She pays Tony $30 for a shirt,” the equivalent time-
frame item in Study S2A (as well as the time-frame condition of Study 2) read “Sally goes to Tony’s 
clothing store. Sally worked for 1.5 hours to pay Tony for a shirt,” with a separate paragraph describing 
Sally’s after-tax wages at $20 per hour. One of the barter items read “Vivian goes to her colleague 
Tommy’s office. Vivian worked for 20 minutes to pay for a Burger King hamburger, which she trades 
to Tommy in exchange for Tommy’s McDonald’s hamburger,” as in the time-frame of Study 2. 
Study S2B used a money-plus-time-frame, which differed subtly from the time-frame in Study S2A by 
including both the monetary and the time cost: “Sally goes to Tony’s clothing store. She pays Tony 
$30 (which took Sally 1.5 hours of work to earn) for a shirt.” A barter item read “Vivan goes to her 
colleague Tommy’s office. She trades her Burger King hamburger (which took Vivian 20 minutes of 
work to earn) for Tommy’s McDonald’s hamburger.” This phrasing does not explicitly mention the 
monetary value of the good (since the Study 1 phrasing did not do so either) but implicitly cued money 
by mentioning that it took a given amount of time to “earn” the good. 
 
Results and Discussion. As shown in Figure S2, the asymmetries among buyers, sellers, and 
traders replicate once again, but are generally smaller in Study S2A (in the time-frame) compared to 
Study 1 (the money-frame) or Study S2B (the money-plus-time-frame). This buttresses the results of Study 2 
and further implicates mercantilism as the driver of these effects by showing that it is avoiding money-
talk, rather than introducing time-talk, that is driving these framing effects. 
First, we note that the key asymmetries among buyers, sellers, and traders remain statistically 
robust in Studies S2A and S2B. Buyers were likelier to be deemed worse-off compared to sellers [t(60) 
= 4.68, p < .001, d = 0.78 and t(82) = 6.94, p < .001, d = 1.08 in Studies S2A and S2B, respectively], 
which led to higher welfare-change scores for buyers than for sellers [t(60) = 3.60, p < .001, d = 0.49 
and t(82) = 7.61, p < .001, d = 0.85]. Moreover, traders were seen as likelier to experience no-benefit 
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compared to both buyers [t(60) = 5.11, p < .001, d = 0.84 and t(82) = 9.02, p < .001, d = 1.18] and 
sellers [t(60) = 4.42, p < .001, d = 0.77 and t(82) = 9.22, p < .001, d = 1.27], resulting in lower welfare-
change scores on average for barters versus monetary transactions (averaging across buyers and sellers) 
[t(60) = 7.03, p < .001, d = 0.60 and t(82) = 7.39, p < .001, d = 0.75]. All of these results qualitatively 
replicate the asymmetries found in the other studies. 
 
Figure S2. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders in the money-frame condition (Study 1), time-frame condition (Study S2A), and money-
plus-time condition (Study S2B). 
 
But quantitatively, there was some evidence for variation in the magnitude of these asymmetries 
across studies. Just as the asymmetries were smaller in the time-frame condition of Study 2 compared 
to the money-frame condition, the asymmetries were smaller in Study S2A than in Study 1. Some of 
these differences across studies reached significance and others did not, but all were directionally 
consistent with predictions. 
Buyers were seen as directionally (but not significantly) less likely to experience negative welfare-
change in Study S2A [M = 1.98, SD = 2.12 out of 8] compared to Study 1[M = 2.53, SD = 2.47 out 
of 8; t(145) = 1.41, p = .16, d = 0.24] or Study S2B [M = 2.54, SD = 2.58 out of 8; t(142) = 1.38, p = 
.17, d = 0.23]. These led to comparable (non-significant) trends on mean welfare-change scores for 
buyers across experiments [M = 1.03, SD = 1.41 vs. M = 0.69, SD = 1.48 vs. M = 0.74, SD = 1.38; 
t(145) = 1.45, p = .15, d = 0.24 and t(142) = 1.28, p = .20, d = 0.22]. 
Traders were seen as significantly less likely to experience no-benefit in Study S2A [M = 2.00, SD 
= 2.37 out of 8] compared to Study 1 [M = 3.29, SD = 2.98 out of 8; t(145) = 2.81, p = .006, d = 0.47] 
or Study S2B [M = 3.43, SD = 3.01 out of 8; t(142) = 3.08, p = .002, d = 0.52]. However, the differences 
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SD = 1.06 vs. M = 0.51, SD = 0.93 vs. M = 0.51, SD = 0.94; t(145) = 1.26, p = .21, d = 0.21 and 
t(142) = 1.22, p = .22, d = 0.21]. 
Overall, these results—while less statistically robust than the within-subjects Study 2—help to 
buttress the results of that study in two ways. The money-frame versus time-frame across Studies 1 
and S2A produced reduced asymmetries comparable in magnitude (if not larger) than those in Study 
2, although some of these reductions did not reach statistical significance. Second, the fact that Study 
S2B and Study 1 produced very similar results indicates that a money-frame and money-plus-time-
frame have similar psychological impact. That is a further piece of evidence for mercantilism, which 
predicts that cueing money (even if time is also cued) would result in perceived differences in buyer 
versus seller welfare.  
 
Study S3: Between-Subjects Replication of Study 3 
 
We argued that although mercantilism explains the asymmetries between buyers and sellers, it does 
not necessarily predict that they would need to be as sharp as they are across these studies. Plausibly, 
other factors may also be at play, and we argued that theory-of-mind or naïve realism is likely to be 
one such factor (Ross & Ward, 1997; Ross et al., 1977). Supporting this, Study 3 found that cueing 
participants to consider the buyers’ reasons—even empty reasons such as because the buyer “wanted” 
the product—reduced win–win denial. 
Study S3 had two goals. First, analogously to Study S2, it aimed to replicate Study 3 in a between-
subjects design. Whereas Study 3 exposed participants to both the empty-reason and no-reason condition, 
Study S3A framed every item in the empty-reason condition. Thus, comparing Study S3A to Study 1 
is equivalent to testing the effect of the reason versus no-reason conditions (tested within-subjects in 
Study 3) in a between-subjects design. Second, Study S3 tested whether different kinds of reasons have 
differential impact. Thus, whereas Study S3A used the same empty reasons from Study 3, Study S3B 
gave “content” reasons that appealed directly to the buyer’s preferences. 
 
Methods. We recruited 199 participants (Mage = 38.8; 67% female; 55% college educated) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 99 for Study S3A and N = 100 for Study S3B); 26 were excluded 
from analysis based on the criterion used in the other studies. 
Study S3A used the same design as Study 1, except every item appeared in the empty-reason phrasing 
used in Study 3. That is, each transaction included an empty explanation of the buyer’s or traders’ 
choice, such as “Sally made the purchase because she wanted the shirt.” Study S3B was identical, 
except that a content-reason was given instead, which appealed to the buyer’s or traders’ preferences, 
such as “Sally purchased the shirt because Taylor Swift once wore this kind of shirt at her concert, 
and Sally loves Taylor Swift very much” or “Eric got the haircut because he finds the environment in 
Paul’s barber shop to be pleasant and enjoyable.” Similarly, for one of the barters, “Mark traded 
because he needed vinegar for a recipe, and Fred traded because he happened to run out of soy sauce.” 
 
Results and Discussion. As shown in Figure S3, we see yet again the asymmetries among buyers, 
sellers, and traders predicted by mercantilism. But these are less statistically robust than in other 
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experiments and do not always reach significance—this is the only study in the main or supplementary 
text that does not produce highly robust asymmetries between traders and monetary transactors. This 
is because win–win denial was overall much lower in the empty-reason and content-reason versions 
used in Study S3, compared to the no-reason version used in Study 1. Indeed, these differences among 
conditions were much larger in magnitude than in the within-subjects Study 3. These results point to 
theory-of-mind errors as a partial driver of win–win denial and to perspective-taking as a useful 
corrective. 
 
Figure S3. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders in the no-reason condition (Study 1), empty-reason condition (Study S3A), and content-
reason condition (Study S3B). 
 
First, we examine again the asymmetries among buyers, sellers, and traders. Buyers remained 
likelier to be seen as made worse-off compared to sellers in both Study S3A [t(86) = 4.08, p < .001, d 
= 0.56] and Study S3B [t(85) = 4.95, p < .001, d = 0.73], with these differences also reflected in the 
mean welfare-change scores in both studies [t(86) = 4.95, p < .001, d = 0.38 and t(85) = 4.06, p < .001, 
d = 0.37]. In both studies, traders were likelier to be given no-change scores compared to both buyers 
[t(86) = 3.79, p < .001, d = 0.57 and t(85) = 2.01, p = .048, d = 0.25] and sellers (though not significantly 
for Study S3B) [t(86) = 4.52, p < .001, d = 0.61 and t(85) = 1.24, p = .22, d = 0.14]. Unlike the difference 
between buyers and sellers, the mean welfare-change scores did not significantly differ between barters 
and monetary transactions (averaging across buyers and sellers) in either experiment [t(86) = 1.08, p = 
.28, d = 0.08 and t(85) = 1.24, p = .22, d = 0.10]. As we will see, this reflects the much lower rate of 
win–win denial seen in Study S3. 
Next, we directly compare the rates of win–win denial across studies. Buyers were seen as losing 
from their transactions much less frequently, compared with the no-reason framing in Study 1 [M = 











8; t(171) = 4.34, p < .001, d = 0.66] or content-reasons were given in Study S3B [M = 0.92, SD = 1.47 
out of 8; t(170) = 5.21, p < .001, d = 0.79]; Studies S3A and S3B did not differ from one another 
[t(171) = 0.52, p = .60, d = 0.08]. These trends were also reflected in the mean welfare-change scores 
for buyers, which were significantly more positive in Study S3A [M = 2.18, SD = 1.79; t(171) = 5.98, 
p < .001, d = 0.91] and Study S3B [M = 2.16, SD = 1.35; t(170) = 6.82, p < .001, d = 1.04] compared 
to Study 1 [M = 0.69, SD = 1.48]. 
Similar effects were seen for traders. The perception that traders experience no change from their 
barters was significantly lower in both Study S3A [M = 1.40, SD = 2.58 out of 8; t(171) = 4.46, p < 
.001, d = 0.68] and Study S3B [M = 0.84, SD = 1.84 out of 8; t(170) = 6.50, p < .001, d = 0.99], relative 
to Study 1 [M = 3.29, SD = 2.98]; this effect was slightly larger in Study S3B (with content reasons), 
reflected in a marginally significant difference between Studies S3A and S3B [t(171) = 1.66, p =.099]. 
These effects translated into much higher welfare-change scores for barters in Study S3A [M = 2.34, 
SD = 1.92; t(171) = 7.98, p < .001, d = 1.21] and Study S3B [M = 2.54, SD = 1.45; t(170) = 10.96, p 
< .001, d = 1.67] compared to Study 1 [M = 0.51, SD = 0.93]. 
Overall, the perspective-taking manipulations led to much lower rates of win–win denial and zero-
sum thinking. Whereas most participants in Study 1 (88%) believed that at least one of the transactions 
was non-positive-sum, this proportion was far lower in Studies S3A (39%) and S3B (41%). Likewise, 
whereas nearly all participants in Study 1 (94%) believed that at least one individual in one of the 
transactions failed to benefit, this proportion was more modest in Studies S3A (60%) and S3B (65%). 
Thus, although perspective-taking interventions certainly did not eliminate zero-sum thinking, it 
dramatically lowered its incidence. 
Overall, these results attest to the significance of theory-of-mind in win–win denial—providing 
reasons for buyers’ choices, even if totally devoid of content, cues people to realize that people rarely 
voluntarily trade at a loss. Nonetheless, theory-of-mind cannot be the whole story, since it does not 
predict the asymmetries that we are consistently seeing among buyers, sellers, and traders. Theory-of-
mind errors and intuitive mercantilism work together to produce our flawed intuitions about 
exchanges, and both appear to contribute to zero-sum thinking. 
 
Study S4: Cueing Preferences 
 
Study S4 further tested the theory-of-mind account by examining whether increasing the saliency 
of the transactors’ preferences increases the perception that the exchanges are win–win. That is, it is 
likely that, if asked explicitly, people would recognize that buyers preferred the good they purchased 
over the money they spent, while sellers prefer the money over the good. Indeed, neoclassical 
economics goes so far as to define preferences as revealed by one’s choices (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). 
Even if people do not hold this strong assumption of revealed preferences, they probably recognize 
that choices are typically aligned with preferences. However, from the fact that preferences were 
satisfied it follows logically that both parties to each exchange benefitted. Hence, cueing preferences 
as an intermediate step may help to circumvent theory-of-mind limits. 
A second goal of Study S4 was to further rule out the concern that participants interpret the 
dependent variable in exclusively monetary terms. This was addressed partly in Study S1, which used 
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the phrase “benefitted” rather than “better off,” but we put this concern to rest in Study S4 by 
providing participants with detailed instructions about how we define “better off” and requiring 
participants to correctly answer a series of check questions to ensure that they can correctly apply this 
definition. 
 
Methods. We recruited 100 participants (Mage = 43.5, 49% female, 58% college educated) from 
Mechanical Turk; 19 were excluded from analysis based on the criterion used in the other studies 
(failing at least 33% of the check questions at the end of the study) or because they answered one or 
more of the instruction comprehension check questions incorrectly. A further 12 participants were 
excluded who made an error on any of the preference questions (see below). Hence, all participants 
included in the final sample acknowledged that all transactions satisfied the preferences of both parties. 
As shown below, however, excluding participants based on their answers to the preference questions 
does not affect the results. 
The procedure was similar to Study 1, with two changes. First, participants were provided detailed 
definitions of the terms “better off” and “worse off”: 
 
For each transaction, you will be asked whether each participant is “better off,” “worse off,” or “the same,” 
relative to how they were before the transaction. When we use these terms, we are asking whether, all things 
considered, each person has benefited – in the language of economics, whether each person has increased 
“utility” after the transaction compared to beforehand. We are using a very wide definition of “benefit” or 
“utility” that includes any monetary gains or losses and any gains or losses in convenience, health, pleasure, 
or any other reason a person would carry out a transaction. 
 
Then participants completed four sample items that were framed around chance events rather than 
transactions, so as not to introduce demand characteristics for the main task. These events were 
“George finds a $10 bill on the ground but loses a $1 bill,” “Rachel finds a $5 bill on the ground but 
loses a $100 bill,” “Ralph finds a $100 bill on the ground but lost a movie ticket that he would have 
been willing to pay $10 for,” and “Judy finds a $5 bill on the ground but lost a concert ticket that she 
would have been willing to pay $50 for.” For each event, participants responded as a forced-choice 
whether each person was made “better off,” “the same,” or “worse off.” Crucially, two of these items 
required participants to compare monetary and non-monetary utility, and in one case the correct 
answer was that the person was made worse-off despite gaining currency. Participants incorrectly 
answering any of these questions were excluded from data analysis, implementing a maximally strict 
standard for comprehension of the dependent variable. 
Second, for half of the items (in the preference-cue condition), participants were first asked to state 
(as a forced-choice) the preferences of each party to each transaction. For example, for the item asking 
about Sally’s trip to Tony’s clothing store to buy a shirt for $30, participants were asked “Which do 
you think Sally preferred?” and “Which do you think Tony preferred?” as a forced-choice (“the shirt” 
or “$30”). Likewise, for the item asking about Tommy and Vivian’s swap of their Burger King and 
McDonald’s burgers, participants were asked which Tommy and Vivian preferred (“the Burger King 
hamburger” or “the McDonald’s hamburger”). Participants were highly accurate in answering these 
questions. Among participants who were not excluded due to errors on the instruction or memory 
check questions, the average number of errors on these questions was 0.35 out of 8, with all but 12 
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participants answering all questions correctly. For the other half of the items (in the no-cue condition), 
these preference questions were omitted. The 4 items in each condition were blocked and the order 
of the two blocks was counterbalanced. 
Because the preference questions are difficult to phrase unambiguously for services (e.g., which 
did the dog groomer prefer – $45 or the time and labor associated with grooming the dog), we omitted 
these items to ensure that the manipulation was clear. Hence, participants in Study S4 saw the 4 
monetary purchases of goods and 4 barters used in the other studies, with half of the monetary 
purchases and half of the barters appearing each in the preference-cue and no-cue conditions, 
counterbalanced across items. 
 
Results. Overall, the no-cue condition replicates the mercantilist pattern seen in the other studies. 
This pattern is attenuated in the preference-cue condition, just as cueing buyers’ reasons for 
transactions in Studies 3 and S3 reduced win–win denial. 
 
Figure S4. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders across no-cue and preference-cue conditions of Study S4. 
 
We first examine the no-cue condition, which is conceptually similar to Study 1 in the main text, 
except that participants were inculcated in the meaning of “better off” and “worse off.” The results 
were very similar to those of Study 1. As shown in Figure S4, in the no-cue condition, participants 
much more frequently claimed that buyers rather than sellers were harmed by transactions [M = 0.83, 
SD = 0.86 vs. M = 0.04, SD = 0.21 out of 2; t(68) = 7.45, p < .001, d = 1.26]. This led to lower welfare 
scores for buyers than for sellers [M = 0.04, SD = 1.80 vs. M = 1.85, SD = 1.42; t(68) = 6.63, p < 











To adjust for the fact that Study S4 included 4 observations of trader welfare in each condition (2 
observations for each of 2 items) but only 2 observations of buyer and seller welfare in each condition 
(1 observation each of buyer and seller welfare for each of 2 items), we divide the counts of positive, 
zero, and negative welfare change for traders to create comparable measurements. Participants far 
more frequently claimed that traders [M = 0.70, SD = 0.84 out of 2 after adjustment] experience zero 
change in welfare compared to buyers [M = 0.17, SD = 0.48 out of 2; t(68) = 5.00, p < .001, d = 0.77] 
or sellers [M = 0.07, SD = 0.31 out of 2; t(68) = 5.70, p < .001, d = 1.00]. This manifested in marginally 
lower welfare-change scores for barters than for monetary transactions (averaging across buyers and 
sellers) [M = 0.69, SD = 1.27 vs. M = 0.94, SD = 1.16; t(68) = 1.73, p = .088, d = 0.20]. Thus, the 
mercantilist intuitions on evidence in the other studies are replicated in Study S4, even with detailed 
definitions of “welfare” and instruction check questions to ensure comprehension of this definition. 
Next, we compare the preference-cue to the no-cue condition. If the preference-cue assists 
participants in taking the perspective of the buyers and traders, then we would expect buyers and 
traders to be seen as more likely to gain, and hence their welfare-change scores to be higher. We would 
not necessarily expect comparable effects for sellers, for the reasons given in connection with Study 
3, which revealed only weak tendencies for mentalizing to increase the perceived welfare of sellers. 
As shown in Figure S4, these predictions were borne out. In the preference-cue condition, buyers 
were less likely to be seen as losing [M = 0.52, SD = 0.78 vs. M = 0.83, SD = 0.86 out of 2; t(68) = 
3.65, p < .001, d = 0.37] and traders less likely to be seen as experiencing zero change [M = 0.94, SD 
= 1.49 vs. M = 1.41, SD = 1.67 out of 2; t(68) = 3.33, p = .001, d = 0.29], but sellers equally likely to 
be seen as gaining [M = 1.87, SD = 0.45 vs. M = 1.88, SD = 0.37 out of 2; t(68) = 0.24, p = .81, d = 
0.04], compared to the no-cue condition. This manifested in more positive welfare-change scores for 
buyers [M = 0.59, SD = 1.65 vs. M = 0.04, SD = 1.80; t(68) = 3.01, p = .004, d = 0.32] and traders [M 
= 1.20, SD = 1.63 vs. M = 0.69, SD = 1.27; t(68) = 4.03, p < .001, d = 0.34], but not sellers [M = 1.79, 
SD = 1.43 vs. M = 1.85, SD = 1.42; t(68) = –0.30, p = .77, d = –0.04]. 
Plausibly, one might be concerned that excluding participants who made any errors on the 
preference questions could lead to a differential attrition problem that would bias the results in favor 
of more positive scores in the preference-cue condition. That is, since the preference questions were 
only asked in the preference-cue condition, one could argue that we selectively eliminated participants 
who had particularly negative views of the transactions in that condition. Hence, we repeated all 
analyses adding back in the participants who were eliminated due to their answers to these questions 
(N = 12). The results were very similar. In the preference-cue condition, buyers were less likely to be 
seen as losing [t(80) = 3.79, p < .001, d = 0.36] and traders less likely to be seen as experiencing zero 
change [t(80) = 3.29, p = .001, d = 0.25], but sellers no less likely to be seen as gaining [t(80) = 0.00, p 
= 1.00, d = 0.00]. Once again this resulted in more positive welfare-change scores for buyers [t(80) = 
3.43, p < .001, d = 0.34] and traders [t(80) = 4.04, p < .001, d = 0.31] but not sellers [t(80) = 0.44, p = 
.66, d = 0.06]. 
Potentially we might see carry-over effects from one part of the experiment to the next. That is, 
participants may be more prone to seeing transactions as win–win even in the no-cue condition, if this 
condition had been preceded by the preference-cue condition. However, the extent to which buyers 
were seen as losing, sellers as winning, and traders as experiencing zero-change did not differ across 
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the two orders (ts < 1.2, ps > .27), nor did the mean welfare-change scores for buyers, sellers, or 
traders (ts < 1.7, ps > .10). 
 
Discussion. Study S4 supports three conclusions. First, participants rarely claimed that the buyers 
or traders did not prefer the item that they in fact received, suggesting that our minds make a strong 
intuitive link between preferences and choices. This cuts somewhat against the interpretation that 
participants believe the buyers or traders are irrational or deceived by the other party. Second, despite 
detailed instructions and comprehension checks about the definitions of “better off” and “worse off,” 
participants in the no-cue condition showed similar mercantilist patterns as in the other studies. Third, 
these mercantilist intuitions were weaker in the preference-cue condition, supporting the idea that 
theory-of-mind limitations contribute to win–win denial. 
 
Study S5: Subjective Beliefs and First-Person Perspective  
 
Given the large effects of cueing reasons and preferences in Studies 3, S3, and S4, we considered 
two other potential manipulations that might influence the extent of win–win denial.  
Study S5A asked participants to judge the buyers’ and sellers’ beliefs about their relative welfare. By 
asking participants to directly judge whether, for example, Sally believes she is bettered by her chocolate 
bar purchase, they may be encouraged to spontaneously consider Mary’s reasons for making the 
purchase, which would lead to a pattern more like Studies 3 and S3 (where reasons were provided) 
than Study 1 (where they were not). This would also suggest that people believe that others are mistaken 
when they engage in exchanges—they may believe that they are better off, but they in fact are not. 
This is the prediction made by the theory-of-mind account, according to which people typically 
substitute their preferences for that of the buyer. Asking people to explicitly think from the buyer’s 
perspective by using a subjective question wording should, on this account, have a salutary effect on 
win–win denial. 
Study S5B placed the participant in the position of the buyer by adopting a first-person 
perspective. On the one hand, people are known to exaggerate their decision-making abilities (e.g., 
Johnson & Rips, 2014, 2015; Pronin & Kugler, 2010) and might therefore be likelier to think 
themselves as gaining from their purchases. But on the other hand, people actually know their own 
preferences, and in many cases the transactions really may not be worth it. You aren’t better-off 
spending $2 for a chocolate bar if you don’t like chocolate! If theory-of-mind errors are at work, these 
first-person judgments might look very similar to third-person judgments, since one might impute 
one’s own anti-chocolate preferences onto the third-person buyer. Thus, this account predicts that 
Study S5B would produce similar results to Study 1.  
 
Methods. We recruited 199 participants (Mage = 37.9; 61% female; 43% college educated) from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 100 for Study S5A and N = 99 for Study S5B); 31 were excluded 
from analysis based on the criterion used in the other studies. 
For Study S5A, the procedure was identical to Study 1, except that rather than rating the buyers’ 
and sellers’ welfare, participants rated the buyers’ and sellers’ perceived welfare. For example, the 
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dependent measures for Sally and her clothing purchase from Tony were “How well off do you think 
Sally believes she now is?” and “How well off do you think Tony believes he now is?” The instructions 
were modified to reflect this change to a subjective wording (“For each transaction, you will be asked 
whether each participant believes that he or she is better off, worse of, or the same, relative to how 
they were before the transaction”). 
For Study S5B, the procedure was identical to Study 1, except that the buyers in the transactions 
were first-person (“you”) rather than third-person (e.g., “Sally” or “Eric”). One item had to be lightly 
rephrased to make it gender-neutral, but otherwise all items were unchanged. For example, one item 
read “You go to Tony’s clothing store. You pay Tony $30 for a shirt,” and the dependent measures 
were “How well off do you think you now are?” and “How well off do you think Tony now is?” on 
the same scale as previous experiments. The instructions were modified to reflect these changes 
(“…you will read about some transactions, each involving you and another person”). 
 
Results and Discussion. As shown in Figure S5, win–win denial was somewhat less common in 
Study S5A, when explicitly taking the buyers’, sellers’, and traders’ perspectives, compared to other 
studies where one is not cued to take the transactors’ perspectives. However, the first-person framing 
in Study S5B led to similar rates of win–win denial as in Study 1, further implicating theory-of-mind. 
In both studies, asymmetries among buyers, sellers, and traders remained robust. 
First, we replicated the asymmetries among buyers, sellers, and traders that we have seen in every 
other study. Buyers were seen as likelier to lose from transactions compared to sellers in both Study 
S5A [t(81) = 5.41, p < .001, d = 0.76] and Study S5B [t(85) = 7.96, p < .001, d = 1.15], and these trends 
were also reflected in mean welfare-change scores [t(81) = 6.89, p < .001, d = 0.65 and t(85) = 8.89, p 
< .001, d = 0.99]. Likewise, traders were seen as likelier to experience no change in welfare compared 
to both buyers [t(81) = 5.15, p < .001, d = 0.69 and t(85) = 8.08, p < .001, d = 1.12] and sellers [t(81) 
= 5.11, p < .001, d = 0.66 and t(85) = 8.53, p < .001, d = 1.22]. This was also reflected in the mean 
welfare-change scores, which were lower for barters than for monetary transactions (averaging across 
buyers and sellers) [t(81) = 3.59, p < .001, d = 0.40 and t(85) = 7.95, p < .001, d = 0.77]. 
The main issue of interest here is the comparison between these studies and Study 1, which used 
the third-person framing. Win–win denial was somewhat less common in Study S5A than in Study 1, 
reflecting the effect of the subjective wording. Buyers were seen as less likely to lose in Study S5A [M 
= 1.67, SD = 2.22 out of 8] compared to Study 1 [M = 2.53, SD = 2.47 out of 8; t(166) = 2.38, p = 
.019, d = 0.37], which was also reflected in the mean welfare-change scores [M = 1.30, SD = 1.53 vs. 
M = 0.69, SD = 1.48; t(166) = 2.67, p = .008, d = 0.41]. Analogously, traders were seen as less likely 
to experience no change in welfare in Study S5A [M = 1.85, SD = 2.64 out of 8] than in Study 1 [M 
= 3.29, SD = 2.98 out of 8; t(166) = 3.30, p = .001, d = 0.51], also reflected in the mean welfare-
change scores [M = 1.25, SD = 1.27 vs. M = 0.51, SD = 0.93; t(166) = 4.34, p < .001, d = 0.67]. These 
results support the theory-of-mind account, in that subjectively wording the questions to emphasize 
the buyers’ and traders’ perspectives reduced win–win denial. 
However, win–win denial differed little between Study S5B and Study 1, which varied only in using 
first-person versus third-person wording. Buyers were seen as equally likely to lose from their 
transactions across the two studies [t(170) = 0.59, p = .56, d = 0.09], resulting in similar mean welfare-
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change scores [t(170) = 0.94, p = .35, d = 0.14]. Traders were seen as somewhat less likely to experience 
no change in welfare in Study S5B than in Study 1 [M = 2.47, SD = 2.30 vs. M = 3.29, SD = 2.98 out 
of 8; t(170) = 2.04, p = .043, d = 0.31], but this did not translate into a significant difference in mean 
welfare-change scores [t(170) = 1.17, p = .24, d = 0.18]. Overall, Figure S5 shows that the distributions 
are fairly similar between Studies 1 and S5B, which supports the theory-of-mind account by suggesting 
that participants are substituting a question about buyers’ preferences with a question about their own. 
Figure S5. Proportion of transactions perceived as having negative, zero, or positive impact on buyers, 
sellers, and traders when transactions were framed in the third-person (Study 1), in terms of the 
transactors’ subjective preferences (Study S5A), and in the first-person (Study S5B). 
 
Overall, these results provide further support for theory-of-mind errors as a partial explanation of 
win–win denial. Study S5A tests another way of cueing perspective-taking, finding similar results 
(albeit smaller in magnitude) to Studies 3 and S3, which provided a more direct route into the buyers’ 
mental states by giving their reasons. Study S5B, on the other hand, framed transactions in the first 
person and found that people answer these first-person questions in a very similar way to third-person 
questions, suggesting that they substitute their own preferences as they evaluate whether others gain 
or lose from their transactions. 
As one of the reasons why markets are possible is that we all place different subjective valuations 
on things, this finding represents a fundamental misconception about transactions and helps to explain 
the incidence of zero-sum thinking. If two parties have identical preferences and make a trade, one of 
them is winning and the other is losing, whereas if they have different preferences (e.g., because one 
of them can acquire the good at a lower price or because she gains less utility than the other from the 













Part C: Individual Differences 
 
Each experiment measured participants’ educational background and political views. This allowed 
us to test hypotheses about what traits are associated with zero-sum thinking. For instance, one might 
imagine that economics training would attenuate zero-sum thinking, and one could plausibly argue for 
either liberals or conservatives espousing zero-sum attitudes more often (see Davidai & Ongis, 2019). 
To test the impact of these variables, we built a hierarchical linear model, using the data from all 
experiments in the main text and Supplementary Materials (total N = 1188), nesting subjects within 
experiments and allowing a random intercept (but not random slopes) within each experiment. The 
dependent measure in this model was the frequency with which all parties (buyers, sellers, and traders) 
were perceived to be non-beneficiaries (i.e., the proportion of individuals rated as having zero or 
negative gains from trade, multiplied by 100). Dummy-coded variables were entered for experiment 
comparing these experiments to Study 1. The other variables in the model included educational 
variables—educational level (on a 7-point scale; Mdn = some college), major (dummy-coded with 1 = 
economics or business; 17% business/econ majors), economics knowledge (on a 0–10 scale; M = 
4.53, SD = 2.49), and number of economics courses (M = 1.40, SD = 1.84); political views—social 
conservatism (on a 0–10 scale; M = 3.91, SD = 2.95) and economic conservatism (on a 0–10 scale; M 
= 4.65, SD = 2.93); and basic demographics—gender (dummy-coded with 1 = female; 59% female), 
age (M = 37.9, SD = 12.9), and income (square-root transformed; Mdn = $35,000). We also measured 
political party (on a 0–10 scale with higher numbers indicating stronger Republican identification; M 
= 4.03, SD = 3.00), but did not enter this variable into the model due to its multicollinearity with the 
other political variables. However, either adding this variable to the model or replacing the other two 
political variables with political party do not alter the results. 
The model coefficients are reported in Table S2. Model 1 tests the impact of economics knowledge 
and education. Although formal education did not have an impact on zero-sum thinking (either overall 
education level or number of economics courses), self-reported economics knowledge had an 
appreciable effect on zero-sum thinking. For every one point (on a 0–10 scale) of self-reported 
economics knowledge, participants indicated about one percentage point fewer individuals had failed 
to benefit from their transactions. However, this effect was somewhat cancelled out by the impact of 
being a business or economics major, who exhibited significantly higher degrees of zero-sum thinking 
(most of these were business, rather than economics majors, within our sample). This could be 
(regrettably) an effect of the business curriculum at management schools, but it also may be a self-
selection bias. In any event, business majors also reported higher economics knowledge (in a separate 
model predicting economics knowledge), helping to compensate for this tendency. 
Model 2 adds political orientation—separately for economic and social conservatism—to the 
model. Neither variable was a significant predictor. On the one hand, this may be surprising given 
current political discourse, which (at the time of writing) seems to include more zero-sum language 
from conservative politicians, at least within the United States. But given the global resurgence of both 
left-wing and right-wing economic populism, it may be less surprising that political orientation is not 
a good predictor of a zero-sum mentality. One limitation of our measure of economic conservatism 
is that this may be quite conceptually distinct from support of free markets, as Caplan (2007) finds 
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that both political conservatives and liberals are much more skeptical about the effectiveness of 
markets relative to professional economists. 
 
 Coefficient (SE) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Education –0.26 (0.41) –0.22 (0.42) –0.39 (0.43) 
Business/Econ Major 3.82 (1.83)* 3.77 (1.84)* 3.13 (1.87)º 
Econ Knowledge –0.62 (0.28)* –0.63 (0.29)* –0.58 (0.30)º 
Econ Courses –0.43 (0.43) –0.41 (0.43) –0.35 (0.44) 
Social Conservatism  0.22 (0.35) 0.18 (0.35) 
Economic Conservativism  –0.12 (0.35) –0.14 (0.36) 
Female   1.49 (1.32) 
Age   0.044 (0.05) 
Income (square-root)   0.008 (0.01) 
*** p < .001         ** p < .01        * p < .05        º p < .10 
 
Table S2. Predictors of zero-sum thinking pooling data across studies. 
Note. Coefficients (SEs) predicting the proportion (multiplied by 100) of parties regarded as non-beneficiaries. 
 
Another possibility, however, is that the political dynamics are somewhat more complex than these 
models suggest. Economic conservatism, social conservatism, and political conservatism were all 
highly correlated in our sample [rs > .79, ps < .001]. But they do appear to be conceptually distinct. 
For example, economic conservatism was positively associated with both self-reported economics 
knowledge [b = 0.09, p = .019] and formal economics coursework [b = 0.15, p < .001], while social 
conservatism had no association with economics knowledge [b = –0.00, p = .93] and a negative 
relationship with economics coursework [b = –0.08, p = .011]. Given the link between economics 
knowledge and lower levels of win–win denial, it could be that social conservatism and economic 
conservatism have opposite effects on zero-sum thinking, which are difficult to detect because they 
are so strongly correlated in our politically partisan environment. 
Finally, Model 3 added demographic variables (gender, age, income) to the model, none of which 
had any additional predictive value. This is important to the extent that we wish to generalize the 
current results beyond the sampled population of Mechanical Turk workers, as one might argue that 
this population is relatively low in socioeconomic status and thus more prone to perceiving themselves 
as made worse-off by economic forces. But we see little evidence for this story, given no link between 
income and win–win denial within our sample. 
Despite some significant predictors across these models, what is perhaps most striking is how little 
of the variability is explained by individual difference variables, even in cases where the factors had a 
statistically reliable effect. At least among our American participants, zero-sum thinking appears to 
generalize across people with very different political beliefs, educational backgrounds, and income 
levels. Apparently the zero-sum misconception is deeply rooted in human beings, and even extensive 
economics education does less than one would hope to root it out. The various manipulations 
explored in the current studies may be a more effective wedge to influence beliefs and behaviors. 
